Article on the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Buddhism published in the journal "Quaderni Asians." See
Christian Martorella, affinity between Zen Buddhism and the philosophy of Wittgenstein, in "Quaderni Asians", n. 61, March 2003, pp.91-99.
affinity between Zen Buddhism and Wittgenstein's philosophy of Christian Martorella
Wittgenstein and Eastern thought
Who is in charge of Eastern philosophy, particularly Zen Buddhism, can not but be surprised to find in a Western thinker, so alien the context of Asian culture, a significant amount of affinity. This is especially interesting if you add that Wittgenstein knew nothing works and authors Eastern. He had studied at the Technical University of Berlin and the Faculty of Engineering of Manchester, was finally dedicated to the study of logic at Cambridge. As you can see his interests were far from any text of Eastern philosophy. Yet Wittgenstein found himself facing the same problems that had committed the sages of India, China and Japan. Why? Simply because the research field was the same: language. Buddha had pointed to the eastern origin of suffering. A bad or excessive use thought of benefit to man tension, anxiety, fear and suffering. Wittgenstein was a man deeply troubled by the same problems. He was strongly dissatisfied with the inability of Western philosophy in responding to his questions. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he stated: "(...) the value of this work is then, secondly, to show how little worth having solved these problems "(1).
Philosophy of Language
Wittgenstein realized that the problems of philosophy are false problems, so its investigation moves on the analysis of these pseudo-problems. The aim of Wittgenstein's philosophy is only to show and delete pseudo-problems.
Wittgenstein was not the first to identify a logical fallacy in the ambiguity of language and the origin of the speculative problems of errors and therefore the whole philosophy. In India, with a skill just as equal, Nagarjuna was able to show the emptiness of every concept and every word. The similarities between the teachings of Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein go further. According to Nagarjuna, as Buddhism teaches, everything is in relationship with others, and nothing makes sense without the other. Wittgeinstein speaks of the principle of contextuality, and says a very similar concept. The meaning of a word or a concept depends on its context. Nagarjuna argued the language prammaticità Wittgeinstein and reiterates the instrumentality of the word by saying that the meaning and use.
Philosophy as therapy
According to Wittgenstein the purpose of philosophy is not to erect a building of concepts, philosophical system, but rather a continuous and thorough control over the language. Philosophy should provide a "grammar" perspicuous language (2). It is not a doctrine but an activity.
The noblest form of Buddhism, free of superstition and metaphysical beliefs, have the same attitude. Buddhism, especially Zen, requires constant practice, not a religion that requires only the measure of faith (3). Pray and believe is totally inadequate. Piuttosto è la pratica con un impegno che implica la totale partecipazione dell’individuo a caratterizzare tale filosofia. Attraverso la meditazione zazen oppure con quesiti koan, il Buddhismo persegue questa strategia che intende liberare l'individuo dagli errori che controllano la sua mente.
Koan di Wittgenstein
Inconsapevole di tale tradizione, anche Wittgeinstein però ne applicò il metodo. Le sue lezioni erano molto simili a sedute in cui i discepoli vengono interrogati attraverso l’uso di un koan. Che Wittgenstein praticasse tale tecnica ci è testimoniato dalle sue stesse opere che restano enigmatiche se non si interpreta correttamente il modo d'operare dell'autore. Ma vediamo da vicino questi esempi di koan Wittgenstein.
"Could a machine think?" (Philosophical Investigations, Par.359)
"The chair thinks to himself: where? In one of its parts? Or outside the body?" (Philosophical Investigations, Par.360)
"I'm going to leave tomorrow. When you have the intention? Continuously or intermittently?" (Zettel, Par.46)
"Consider the command: Laugh sincerely to this joke!" (Zettel, Par.51)
"What it means: the truth of a proposition is certain?" (On Certainty, Par.193)
"So, if you doubt it, or I'm not sure that this is my hand, why do not I have to question the meaning of these words?" (On Certainty, Par.456)
None of these questions can have a precise answer. Contrary to what happens to the questions in the usual Western philosophical tradition. As the koan, the answer is outside of the concepts framed by the question. Wittgenstein shows us the embarrassment or the paradox of its questions arise from the lack of clarity of language and deception come from this. To understand his questions we must destroy the machinery of prejudice that control our minds.
The prospect of Japanese philosophers
affirm the existence of an affinity between Zen and Wittgenstein's philosophy is merely a hypothesis with no possibility of verifying if not kept it account the current philosophical studies in Japan. In fact, a thorough knowledge of contemporary Japanese philosophy, Wittgenstein tells us that it is among Western authors looked at with interest. Some Japanese scholars come to say that there would be a very strong consonance between his philosophical method and practice of Zen. The net position in this regard is taken by the sociologist Hashizume Daisaburo (4). In no wise Bukkyo gensetsu senryaku (verbal strategy of Buddhism), he comes to say, according to his interpretation, Wittgenstein would have even suffered the ostracism of Western culture permeated by the spirit of Judeo-Christian. According to Hashizume, philosophy of language Wittgenstein would first and foremost a critique of truth-functional logic, and secondly, an alternative to Western conceptual system based on a dialectic discourse and determination, but abstract. It is not entirely unfounded regarded as Wittgenstein has quickly achieved through the introduction of truth tables, the maximum development of truth-functional logic. And note, especially, how much is left unsatisfied at the point of completely changing the approach to the problems of philosophy and linguistics.
Hashizume goes on to analyze the strategies of Buddhism in order to achieve satori. He compares the language game (Sprachspiel) Wittgenstein's techniques of Buddhism to reach the state of enlightenment. Satori has the same problems of the philosophical system based on the language game. For example, the paradox of pain perception (5). Wittgenstein had seen in phrases like "I feel pain" and "he feels pain," a phenomenological diversity due to a relapse. Pain is a unique experience and its verbal expression ("I feel pain") is different by the words we do not know the pain of others ("He feels pain"). It thus remains an indiscernible that the grammar is not fully revealed. At least the grammar of Western languages, we know that in Japan things are very different, distinguishing the two sentences from the point of grammar.
Hashizume finds an analogy in the state of satori. We do not know what satori. To know what we get. But when we met, how do we know who is really the satori? This problem arises from a linguistic trap. Basing only on a knowledge of language, we lose most of the faculties that allow us to act on reality.
To resolve this difficulty, recognizing the inescapable reality of the language, immersed in the reality, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of 'rule-following "(6). Hashizume recognizes the "rule-following" a practice similar to the technique of Buddhism. Orientalists have in mind the notion of C, follow a path, and how it is made. The teacher indicates, does not explain what to do. He shows a procedure, the student repeats it. The conceptual element, the explanation and the theory is entirely absent.
Important in this regard, it is also wise ni okeru Chinmoku Wittgenstein (in Wittgenstein's silence) of the philosopher Hajime Nakamura (7). Nakamura trace the outlines of a philosophy-oriented but not discursive practices. This corresponds to the teachings of Zen, but also to what Wittgenstein has made his philosophical work. The Japanese use the term mushin to describe a void of emotions and thoughts that would be the basis for meditation and subsequent enlightenment. Nakamura identifies Wittgenstein with an empty silence, stopping the use of truth-functional logic and dialectic discourse. Returning to
Hashizume, we see that the Japanese sociologist arrives to explain certain aspects of Buddhism through the philosophy of Wittgenstein. According to Hashizume, you can find the principle of 'rule-following "in the condition of the Buddhist community (sangha) that includes monks (bhikku), the novices (samanera) and laity (upasakas). In this case, no one knows the "rule". It should identify with the figure of the Buddha. But who really knows Buddha? So everyone is trying to follow his model, precisely "follow the rule." To do this, need only recall the words of Wittgenstein that the outstanding issues: "There are not enough rules, but we also need examples. Our rules leave open some loopholes, and the practice has to speak for itself" (8). For Buddhism, the supreme example is the Buddha.
Wittgenstein showed that the danger was to confuse the "follow a rule" with "interpreting a rule." A threat that struck at the roots every kind of philosophy of language that conflicted with an abstract and conceptual use of the word. The kind of philosophy that Wittgenstein disliked by his notion of "meaning as use." A conception of language, as noted by Hashizume, who was shot by John Austin (9), and allowed to return to practice the language. Conclusions
You could say that Wittgenstein brought to light a different conception of philosophy, much closer to the Eastern tradition. According to this view, the thought would not have a mental picture of the world, to speculate something, otherwise it would also be quite truthful to reality. Instead, the Eastern philosophy shows us the opposite. Rather the thought is something that is produced by our mind in relation to the world. Human error is to confuse thought with the world. The failure of Western philosophy is the attempt to explain the world with his thoughts. The thought may explain only the thought, and life is something else.
Notes 1. See Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Einaudi, Torino, 1989 ("New Universal Einaudi" / 196), p. 5.
2. "Method of philosophy: the perspicuous representation of the facts of grammar." See Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophy, Donzelli, Rome, 1996, p. 27.
3. "It is only such action as the existence of Buddhist life becomes completely free (...)". See Hisamatsu, Shin'ichi, a religion without God, The melangolo, Genova, 1996, p. 69.
4. Hashizume, Daisaburo, no Bukkyo gensetsu senryaku, in "Gendaishiso," special issue Voll. 13-14, Seidosha, Tokyo 1985.
5. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Einaudi, Torino, 1995, pp.119-138.
6. Ibid, pp.108-116.
7. Nakamura, Hajime, Wittgenstein ni okeru Chinmoku, in "Gendaishiso," special issue Voll. 13-14, Seidosha, Tokyo, 1985, pp. 210-217.
8. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, Einaudi, Torino, 1978, p. 26.
9. Austin, John, How to do things with words, Marietti, Genova, 1987.
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