CAUTION
From September 1, 2010 this blog moved to the new site
http://profmorittu.blogspot.com/
These pages are still available for consultation.
I wait on the new blog.
Thursday, August 19, 2010
Leroi Air Commpressor Manual
AVVISO AGLI UTENTI
CAUTION
From September 1, 2010 this blog moved to the new site
http://profmorittu.blogspot.com/
These pages are still available for consultation.
I wait on the new blog.
CAUTION
From September 1, 2010 this blog moved to the new site
http://profmorittu.blogspot.com/
These pages are still available for consultation.
I wait on the new blog.
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Holcomb Shower Doors Measure Sheet
I filosofi giapponesi e la logica
Article on Japanese philosophers and discuss blog published by the logic of Japan.
Japanese philosophers and the logic of Christian Martorella
August 10, 2010. The golden age of Japanese philosophy reached its zenith in the first half of the twentieth century, and coincided with the revolt against the Western cultural model (1). The idea that Japanese culture should have its own independent thought was strongly supported by Japanese philosophers, however, the result corresponded to a synthesis of European philosophy with the Eastern tradition, that philosophy with the development of Japan-European Union (tetsugaku) \u200b\u200bthat was already been established in the previous century by Amane Nishi (2). In this context fits
analysis and critique of the logic advanced by the Western Japanese philosophers (3). Since the principle of non-contradiction of one of the basic logic of Western thought, it is natural that it is also one of the claims. The most authoritative critics of the principle of non-contradiction in contemporary Japanese philosophy was expounded by Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945).
Nishida's thought is not an isolated attempt to process the Japanese philosophy, but on the contrary, owes much to the German idealist philosophy, especially Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, but also to Kant, Hume, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, Schopenhauer , Lotze and Hartmann (we have some documentation in the diaries and correspondence that we witness his interests) (4). We know what
Nishida was involved in the study of philosophical texts in Europe, it has become legendary figure of his scholar who spent his nights immersed in reading. There is therefore no reason for surprise if you find Nishida in a revival of Hegel in opposition to the principle of non-contradiction (5).
For Nishida, the contradiction is part of the dialectic of reality. Since the constitutive contradiction of being, it can not be regarded as something apart. The contradiction should not be excluded from reality, so how do you interpret the common sense, as it is placed just inside. So Nishida test a real sense of rejection of the contradiction as presented by the Western tradition. It also showed how Löwith, we had to wait Hegel and Nietzsche to happen because a profound change in philosophy in the West.
The historical fact that for thousands of European philosophy has remained unchanged in principle, can not pass unnoticed. And the thought that these forms of thought have come to join the common Western thought. This sedimentation has become so deep and ancient that go unnoticed. Finally, it is believed that certain things were actually a reflection of reality.
While the West was settled this situation, Japan turned its philosophy attention to itself. Miki Kiyoshi, a student of Nishida, is the author of a unique philosophical text entitled Kosoryoku no ronri (6) (The logic of the conception of thought) which examines the historical development of ideas in the world and their ability to interact with reality.
So the strength of the principle of non-contradiction has more historical reasons and logical-philosophical. Nishida was fully aware of this and decided to use a terminology that distinguished the Western logic of the logic of Japan. He coined the term toyoteki ronri, literally "Eastern logic." Here there is no question of translation as the word means ronri logic, and indicates precisely the logic as understood in the West, namely the study of the conditions of correct reasoning.
In Nishida's thought there were several stages of evolution. The latter is formed by the development of a "logic of place" (basho no ronri), an alternative to traditional Western logic and reworking of contemporary philosophical thought. The logic of place (basho no ronri) also means "the identity of contradictions" (mujunteki Doitsu). In fact, according to Nishida one and the many points of view are only two of the same reality (7).
He also speaks of a determination of a linear and circular determination, which are also different aspects of the same reality. Nishida discusses the concept of space and time. The common thought sees time as linear, it goes from past to future. But if the past is what has been, and the future is what is to come, this, given the past and the future, it makes no sense.
This can not be determined from past and future in this way. What we know is only the present moment. Thus, the present, past and future exist simultaneously. Since simultaneity is the characteristic of space, according to Nishida also time and space. So the time may be determined in two ways, one linear, represented by a vertical line, the other from a horizontal space, represented by a circle closes. "The outside is the inside, The interior and exterior, one is the manifold, the manifold is the one "is the claim that Nishida considers essential. If, for Kant, time is the sense of internal space and the external sense, then, Nishida second, the interior will form within the time and the outside shape in space.
The logic of the place offers an alternative to the linear conception of time considering the time and space in a circle. In this way, even the logical operations are distorted. The modus ponens, for example, implies a linearity that Nishida's logic does not give so easily. Nishida will not stop an epistemic evaluation, but extend these observations and historical considerations social. The opposition individual / company will be given to internal and external relations, therefore an identity.
As you can see, the abandonment of the principle of contradiction provides a rejection of the principle of identity. In Nishida's philosophical system is very clear exposition contradictory identity that is unthinkable without sacrificing the principle of identity. Specifically we will see in the next paragraph, the refusal by the Japanese philosophy of the principle of identity. After
Nishida other major Japanese philosophers have followed this distinction between Western logic (which is taking the principle of non-contradiction) and Eastern logic (which is not accepted the principle of non-contradiction). Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945), a student of Nishida, developed a highly original logic speculative. Based on studies by Pascal (8), and recognize the distinction between spirit and spirit de finesse de géométrie, Miki tried to develop a logical alternative to the logic of reason to explain the power of ideas put to work in the formation of world history. Kosoryoku no ronri (The logic of the conception of thought) (9) is the most significant work that makes this philosophical view of Miki Kiyoshi. Even
Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) departed from the logic nishidiana to criticize the Western logic. But the initial formation of Tanabe is also strongly full of interest for philosophy of science. In studies devoted to the philosophy of science, as gairon Kagaku (Introduction to the Philosophy of Science) (10), he proves to maneuver skillfully in epistemology. But as has happened to other Japanese philosophers, you will soon realize that Western logic is not compatible with Japanese thinking.
For Tanabe, like Nishida, the contradiction is resolved in an indissoluble unity. But Tanabe stands out immediately from the solutions proposed by Nishida, and produces a logic alternative. The intent of Tanabe is clearly to oppose the solution nishidiana proposing a new development. According to the philosophy of Tanabe Hajime
must provide for mediation between philosophical logic and irrationality of reality. We can not be content to remain spectators of the contradictions of the world. This logic will be the "dialectic of absolute mediation" (no Zettai baikai benshoho). The "logic of species" (shu no ronri) developed by Tanabe replaces the "logic of place" Nishida. According
Tanabe, Nishida mistake when analyzing the individual and the universal regardless of who is mediating between these species (shu). Tanabe believes that it has corrected the logic Nishida, but still considered a follower of the philosopher of Kamakura. Tanabe through the "logic of species" comes to a definition of political history dello stato che sarebbe mediatore fra l'universale, l'individuale e la cultura. Così Tanabe crede di aver dato concretezza alla logica di Nishida che rischiava di restare troppo astratta. Ma gli eventi del conflitto mondiale colpiranno profondamente Tanabe che sottoporrà il suo sistema a una revisione. Egli ritiene di aver dato troppa importanza allo stato nazionale, dimenticando i punti di partenza.
Anche in Shu no ronri no bensho (La dialettica della logica della specie) (11) sono espressi questi ripensamenti. Nella sua autocritica, Tanabe affermerà che la sua logica era eccessivamente permeata del principio di identità, trascurando la relativizzazione di ogni prospettiva (ciò che Nishida aveva fatto in modo superbo). Perciò egli will arrive with no tetsugaku Zangedo Toshie (Philosophy as a penance) (12) to a philosophy that shows the limits of reason compared to existence. In this work, Tanabe shows evil as an absolute good perspective of the individual. Instead, see and recognize the diversity would be an act of freedom that would allow for the peaceful existence of human beings. The story of philosophical
Tanabe is therefore troubled. The game ends in a science studies approach to life. But he leaves us a system that allows a logical alternative and ethical and historical implications that flow from it. Even
Takahashi Satomi (1886-1964), author of an essay on Edmund Husserl (13) and translator of Henri Bergson (14), was involved in the Japanese logic. Takahashi different dialectical systems recognized and attempted a synthesis. The results are collected in his book dedicated to this specific problem: I benshoho (The dialectic wraparound) (15). The dialectic of Takahashi Satomi incorporates the Hegelian dialectic, the dialectic nishidiana, but also the formal logic, in a bold and unprecedented attempt of synthesis. As expressed by the name of "dialectical wraparound" includes all developed by the dialectic of Eastern and Western philosophies. The proposed
Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960) is even more original (16). He says in Fudo: ningengakuteki kosatu (The climate: analysis of human nature) there is a close relationship between nature and human character. The influence of different climates would lead to the formation of different cultures (17). Watsuji recognizes the climate of the typhoon, a desert climate, a climate of the prairie that correspond to the cultures of the Far East, Middle Eastern and Western Europe. The end
sensitivity and passion, a sense of resignation towards destiny, dignity, tenacity of the Japanese are understandable, according Watsuji, through the influence of the climate of the typhoon. Watsuji, however, does not omit to say that human existence is also strongly influenced by social relations. The thought of Watsuji, then flows into a philosophical system that determines the man as a product of two forces, a naturale e l'altra sociale. In questo sistema, come in quello di Miki, le leggi del pensiero sono il prodotto di processi ambientali, storici e sociali. Quindi i principi della logica non sono considerati come assoluti e indipendenti dalla realtà.
Anche Mutai Risaku (1890-1974) ha cercato di costruire una logica per il pensiero orientale. Partito dall'intenzione di elaborare una logica per il pensiero di Nishida (18), Mutai si accorse dell'ampiezza del suo lavoro e delle implicazioni che ne derivavano. Mutai critica l'opinione che la logica occidentale rappresenti la forma più corretta del pensiero (19). Secondo Mutai Risaku, la logica occidentale è semplicemente una costruzione che è congeniale al modo di pensare degli occidentali. In this suit opposing a logic of intuition, but also Nishida had often spoken of intuition, and so many other Japanese philosophers.
In this article, which is the reworking of earlier texts already published and discussed, we have shown the positions of some Japanese philosophers on the question of logical form. In conclusion, according to these authors there is no "universal logic, and certainly it is not that developed and offered in Europe and America. In fact, the Western logic is merely one of many possible forms of logic, and this has dramatic consequences of historical and political, as it is easy to ascertain.
Notes 1. Frattolillo, Oliviero, Japan and the West: from the symposium on the cultural revolt of post-modernity, L'Orientale Editrice, Napoli, 2006.
2. Takano Choei was to suggest the first translation of the word Western philosophy (from the greek philosophia). It was his intention to make the meaning of a "general and fundamental knowledge." So gakushi coined the term, roughly translated as knowledge, wisdom and teaching. But in 1874 it was decided to officially adopt the word invented by the philosopher tetsugaku Nishi Amane (1829-1897). The new term was composed of two kanji: tetsu (wisdom) and gaku (Science). See Nishi, Amane, Nishi Amane zenshu, Nippon Hyoronsha, Tokyo, 1944.
3. The similarities and differences Japanese philosophy have already been explained in the following: Martorell, Christ, the truth is the place. Convergences and divergences between Japanese and Western philosophy, in "Diogenes philosophers today," No. 4, Year 2, June-August 2006, pp.14-19.
4. Nishida, Kitaro, Nishida Kitaro zenshu bekkan 1, Nikki, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1951, p. 4.
5. The value of the Hegelian dialectic from a logical point of view read Marsonet, Michele, Logic and Language, vol.1, Pantograph, Genova, 1993, p. 59.
6. Miki, Kiyoshi, no Kosoryoku ronri, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
7. See Nishida, Kitaro, Nishida Kitaro zenshu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1949, vol. 7, p. 204 and vol. 1, p. 86.
8. Miki, Kiyoshi, Pascal's okeru ningen no kenkyu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1980.
9. Miki, Kiyoshi, no Kosoryoku ronri, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
10. Tanabe, Hajime, gairon Kagaku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1918.
11. Si consulti Tanabe, Hajime, Tanabe Hajime zenshu, Chikuma Shobo, Tokyo, 1976.
12. Tanabe, Hajime, no toshite Zangedo tesugaku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
13. Takahashi, Satomi, no genshogaku Husserl, Nipponsha, Tokyo, 1931.
14. Bergson, Henri, Busshitsu to kioku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1936.
15. Takahashi, Satomi, Ho benshoho, Risosha, Tokyo, 1947.
16. Watsuji, Tetsuro, Tetsuro Watsuji zenshu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1992.
17. Watsuji, Tetsuro, Fudo: ningengakuteki kosatu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1979.
18. Mutai, Risaku, no Basho ronrigaku, Kobundo, Tokyo, 1944.
19. Mutai, Risaku, Shisaku to kansatsu, Keiso Shobo, Tokyo, 1971. 
Article on Japanese philosophers and discuss blog published by the logic of Japan.
Japanese philosophers and the logic of Christian Martorella
August 10, 2010. The golden age of Japanese philosophy reached its zenith in the first half of the twentieth century, and coincided with the revolt against the Western cultural model (1). The idea that Japanese culture should have its own independent thought was strongly supported by Japanese philosophers, however, the result corresponded to a synthesis of European philosophy with the Eastern tradition, that philosophy with the development of Japan-European Union (tetsugaku) \u200b\u200bthat was already been established in the previous century by Amane Nishi (2). In this context fits
analysis and critique of the logic advanced by the Western Japanese philosophers (3). Since the principle of non-contradiction of one of the basic logic of Western thought, it is natural that it is also one of the claims. The most authoritative critics of the principle of non-contradiction in contemporary Japanese philosophy was expounded by Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945).
Nishida's thought is not an isolated attempt to process the Japanese philosophy, but on the contrary, owes much to the German idealist philosophy, especially Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, but also to Kant, Hume, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, Schopenhauer , Lotze and Hartmann (we have some documentation in the diaries and correspondence that we witness his interests) (4). We know what
Nishida was involved in the study of philosophical texts in Europe, it has become legendary figure of his scholar who spent his nights immersed in reading. There is therefore no reason for surprise if you find Nishida in a revival of Hegel in opposition to the principle of non-contradiction (5).
For Nishida, the contradiction is part of the dialectic of reality. Since the constitutive contradiction of being, it can not be regarded as something apart. The contradiction should not be excluded from reality, so how do you interpret the common sense, as it is placed just inside. So Nishida test a real sense of rejection of the contradiction as presented by the Western tradition. It also showed how Löwith, we had to wait Hegel and Nietzsche to happen because a profound change in philosophy in the West.
The historical fact that for thousands of European philosophy has remained unchanged in principle, can not pass unnoticed. And the thought that these forms of thought have come to join the common Western thought. This sedimentation has become so deep and ancient that go unnoticed. Finally, it is believed that certain things were actually a reflection of reality.
While the West was settled this situation, Japan turned its philosophy attention to itself. Miki Kiyoshi, a student of Nishida, is the author of a unique philosophical text entitled Kosoryoku no ronri (6) (The logic of the conception of thought) which examines the historical development of ideas in the world and their ability to interact with reality.
So the strength of the principle of non-contradiction has more historical reasons and logical-philosophical. Nishida was fully aware of this and decided to use a terminology that distinguished the Western logic of the logic of Japan. He coined the term toyoteki ronri, literally "Eastern logic." Here there is no question of translation as the word means ronri logic, and indicates precisely the logic as understood in the West, namely the study of the conditions of correct reasoning.
In Nishida's thought there were several stages of evolution. The latter is formed by the development of a "logic of place" (basho no ronri), an alternative to traditional Western logic and reworking of contemporary philosophical thought. The logic of place (basho no ronri) also means "the identity of contradictions" (mujunteki Doitsu). In fact, according to Nishida one and the many points of view are only two of the same reality (7).
He also speaks of a determination of a linear and circular determination, which are also different aspects of the same reality. Nishida discusses the concept of space and time. The common thought sees time as linear, it goes from past to future. But if the past is what has been, and the future is what is to come, this, given the past and the future, it makes no sense.
This can not be determined from past and future in this way. What we know is only the present moment. Thus, the present, past and future exist simultaneously. Since simultaneity is the characteristic of space, according to Nishida also time and space. So the time may be determined in two ways, one linear, represented by a vertical line, the other from a horizontal space, represented by a circle closes. "The outside is the inside, The interior and exterior, one is the manifold, the manifold is the one "is the claim that Nishida considers essential. If, for Kant, time is the sense of internal space and the external sense, then, Nishida second, the interior will form within the time and the outside shape in space.
The logic of the place offers an alternative to the linear conception of time considering the time and space in a circle. In this way, even the logical operations are distorted. The modus ponens, for example, implies a linearity that Nishida's logic does not give so easily. Nishida will not stop an epistemic evaluation, but extend these observations and historical considerations social. The opposition individual / company will be given to internal and external relations, therefore an identity.
As you can see, the abandonment of the principle of contradiction provides a rejection of the principle of identity. In Nishida's philosophical system is very clear exposition contradictory identity that is unthinkable without sacrificing the principle of identity. Specifically we will see in the next paragraph, the refusal by the Japanese philosophy of the principle of identity. After
Nishida other major Japanese philosophers have followed this distinction between Western logic (which is taking the principle of non-contradiction) and Eastern logic (which is not accepted the principle of non-contradiction). Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945), a student of Nishida, developed a highly original logic speculative. Based on studies by Pascal (8), and recognize the distinction between spirit and spirit de finesse de géométrie, Miki tried to develop a logical alternative to the logic of reason to explain the power of ideas put to work in the formation of world history. Kosoryoku no ronri (The logic of the conception of thought) (9) is the most significant work that makes this philosophical view of Miki Kiyoshi. Even
Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) departed from the logic nishidiana to criticize the Western logic. But the initial formation of Tanabe is also strongly full of interest for philosophy of science. In studies devoted to the philosophy of science, as gairon Kagaku (Introduction to the Philosophy of Science) (10), he proves to maneuver skillfully in epistemology. But as has happened to other Japanese philosophers, you will soon realize that Western logic is not compatible with Japanese thinking.
For Tanabe, like Nishida, the contradiction is resolved in an indissoluble unity. But Tanabe stands out immediately from the solutions proposed by Nishida, and produces a logic alternative. The intent of Tanabe is clearly to oppose the solution nishidiana proposing a new development. According to the philosophy of Tanabe Hajime
must provide for mediation between philosophical logic and irrationality of reality. We can not be content to remain spectators of the contradictions of the world. This logic will be the "dialectic of absolute mediation" (no Zettai baikai benshoho). The "logic of species" (shu no ronri) developed by Tanabe replaces the "logic of place" Nishida. According
Tanabe, Nishida mistake when analyzing the individual and the universal regardless of who is mediating between these species (shu). Tanabe believes that it has corrected the logic Nishida, but still considered a follower of the philosopher of Kamakura. Tanabe through the "logic of species" comes to a definition of political history dello stato che sarebbe mediatore fra l'universale, l'individuale e la cultura. Così Tanabe crede di aver dato concretezza alla logica di Nishida che rischiava di restare troppo astratta. Ma gli eventi del conflitto mondiale colpiranno profondamente Tanabe che sottoporrà il suo sistema a una revisione. Egli ritiene di aver dato troppa importanza allo stato nazionale, dimenticando i punti di partenza.
Anche in Shu no ronri no bensho (La dialettica della logica della specie) (11) sono espressi questi ripensamenti. Nella sua autocritica, Tanabe affermerà che la sua logica era eccessivamente permeata del principio di identità, trascurando la relativizzazione di ogni prospettiva (ciò che Nishida aveva fatto in modo superbo). Perciò egli will arrive with no tetsugaku Zangedo Toshie (Philosophy as a penance) (12) to a philosophy that shows the limits of reason compared to existence. In this work, Tanabe shows evil as an absolute good perspective of the individual. Instead, see and recognize the diversity would be an act of freedom that would allow for the peaceful existence of human beings. The story of philosophical
Tanabe is therefore troubled. The game ends in a science studies approach to life. But he leaves us a system that allows a logical alternative and ethical and historical implications that flow from it. Even
Takahashi Satomi (1886-1964), author of an essay on Edmund Husserl (13) and translator of Henri Bergson (14), was involved in the Japanese logic. Takahashi different dialectical systems recognized and attempted a synthesis. The results are collected in his book dedicated to this specific problem: I benshoho (The dialectic wraparound) (15). The dialectic of Takahashi Satomi incorporates the Hegelian dialectic, the dialectic nishidiana, but also the formal logic, in a bold and unprecedented attempt of synthesis. As expressed by the name of "dialectical wraparound" includes all developed by the dialectic of Eastern and Western philosophies. The proposed
Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960) is even more original (16). He says in Fudo: ningengakuteki kosatu (The climate: analysis of human nature) there is a close relationship between nature and human character. The influence of different climates would lead to the formation of different cultures (17). Watsuji recognizes the climate of the typhoon, a desert climate, a climate of the prairie that correspond to the cultures of the Far East, Middle Eastern and Western Europe. The end
sensitivity and passion, a sense of resignation towards destiny, dignity, tenacity of the Japanese are understandable, according Watsuji, through the influence of the climate of the typhoon. Watsuji, however, does not omit to say that human existence is also strongly influenced by social relations. The thought of Watsuji, then flows into a philosophical system that determines the man as a product of two forces, a naturale e l'altra sociale. In questo sistema, come in quello di Miki, le leggi del pensiero sono il prodotto di processi ambientali, storici e sociali. Quindi i principi della logica non sono considerati come assoluti e indipendenti dalla realtà.
Anche Mutai Risaku (1890-1974) ha cercato di costruire una logica per il pensiero orientale. Partito dall'intenzione di elaborare una logica per il pensiero di Nishida (18), Mutai si accorse dell'ampiezza del suo lavoro e delle implicazioni che ne derivavano. Mutai critica l'opinione che la logica occidentale rappresenti la forma più corretta del pensiero (19). Secondo Mutai Risaku, la logica occidentale è semplicemente una costruzione che è congeniale al modo di pensare degli occidentali. In this suit opposing a logic of intuition, but also Nishida had often spoken of intuition, and so many other Japanese philosophers.
In this article, which is the reworking of earlier texts already published and discussed, we have shown the positions of some Japanese philosophers on the question of logical form. In conclusion, according to these authors there is no "universal logic, and certainly it is not that developed and offered in Europe and America. In fact, the Western logic is merely one of many possible forms of logic, and this has dramatic consequences of historical and political, as it is easy to ascertain.
Notes 1. Frattolillo, Oliviero, Japan and the West: from the symposium on the cultural revolt of post-modernity, L'Orientale Editrice, Napoli, 2006.
2. Takano Choei was to suggest the first translation of the word Western philosophy (from the greek philosophia). It was his intention to make the meaning of a "general and fundamental knowledge." So gakushi coined the term, roughly translated as knowledge, wisdom and teaching. But in 1874 it was decided to officially adopt the word invented by the philosopher tetsugaku Nishi Amane (1829-1897). The new term was composed of two kanji: tetsu (wisdom) and gaku (Science). See Nishi, Amane, Nishi Amane zenshu, Nippon Hyoronsha, Tokyo, 1944.
3. The similarities and differences Japanese philosophy have already been explained in the following: Martorell, Christ, the truth is the place. Convergences and divergences between Japanese and Western philosophy, in "Diogenes philosophers today," No. 4, Year 2, June-August 2006, pp.14-19.
4. Nishida, Kitaro, Nishida Kitaro zenshu bekkan 1, Nikki, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1951, p. 4.
5. The value of the Hegelian dialectic from a logical point of view read Marsonet, Michele, Logic and Language, vol.1, Pantograph, Genova, 1993, p. 59.
6. Miki, Kiyoshi, no Kosoryoku ronri, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
7. See Nishida, Kitaro, Nishida Kitaro zenshu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1949, vol. 7, p. 204 and vol. 1, p. 86.
8. Miki, Kiyoshi, Pascal's okeru ningen no kenkyu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1980.
9. Miki, Kiyoshi, no Kosoryoku ronri, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
10. Tanabe, Hajime, gairon Kagaku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1918.
11. Si consulti Tanabe, Hajime, Tanabe Hajime zenshu, Chikuma Shobo, Tokyo, 1976.
12. Tanabe, Hajime, no toshite Zangedo tesugaku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
13. Takahashi, Satomi, no genshogaku Husserl, Nipponsha, Tokyo, 1931.
14. Bergson, Henri, Busshitsu to kioku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1936.
15. Takahashi, Satomi, Ho benshoho, Risosha, Tokyo, 1947.
16. Watsuji, Tetsuro, Tetsuro Watsuji zenshu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1992.
17. Watsuji, Tetsuro, Fudo: ningengakuteki kosatu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1979.
18. Mutai, Risaku, no Basho ronrigaku, Kobundo, Tokyo, 1944.
19. Mutai, Risaku, Shisaku to kansatsu, Keiso Shobo, Tokyo, 1971.
Wednesday, August 4, 2010
What To Eat If You Have Cystitis
La forma logica del pensiero giapponese
Retrieved ch. 4 of the thesis of Christian Martorella.
Christian Martorella, the concept of the Japanese economy from the epistemological point of view, Faculty of Humanities, University of Genoa, AA 1999-2000.
Chapter 4. The logical form of Japanese thought
4.1 The conceptual difference as an epistemological problem
4.2 Sayonara to the principle of non-contradiction
4.3 The forbidden fruit of the principle of identity
4.4 The rigidity of the principle of non-contradiction
4.5 The Japanese form of truth
4.6 Use of denial in the Japanese language
4.7 The principle of the shadow
Chapter 4. The logical form of Japanese thought
4.1 The conceptual difference as an epistemological problem
At this point in our investigation, we encounter a question that directly concerns the epistemology and that we can not delay further. Ours is a radical approach that is based on the identification of specific patterns of thought. The contribution of philosophy is essential, even if sometimes it does not appear in our analysis, so it is important to be clear about how the problems we are facing. The philosophy of science has developed the notion of conceptual scheme as an instrument of cultural development based on concepts that allow you to judge reality.
The greatest contribution to the study and criticism of the definition of conceptual framework was provided by Donald Davidson, author and so we take the utmost account of (1). According to Davidson, an alternative conceptual scheme would be completely unintelligible. It would be impossible to understand what is conceptually different, says Davidson, if the tools of knowledge are totally different? Although an alternative conceptual scheme existed, it would be impossible to translate in another conceptual scheme. Indeed, many Japanese expressions are untranslatable, and almost meet the criteria required by Davidson unintelligibility.
But it is not our purpose to demonstrate the incomprehensibility of Japanese conceptual scheme, indeed, the contrary, you try to explain it. Nor is our intention to refute Davidson because he objected. In fact, Davidson concludes the chapter on the idea of \u200b\u200bconceptual scheme "contained in Truth and Interpretation, assuming a fairly balanced position:
"[...] In fact we have found no intelligible basis on which to say that two patterns are different. Would be equally wrong to announce the good news that all of humanity - or at least all those who have a language - have in common a conceptual framework and an ontology. In fact, if we can not intelligibly say that two patterns are different, we can not intelligibly say that they are one. [...] From the dogma of dualism between scheme and reality, follows the conceptual relativity, and the truth on that pattern. Without the dogma, this kind of relativity disappears from the field. "[D. Davidson, Truth and Interpretation, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1994, p. 282]
The objections raised by Donald Davidson are interesting, but can be found answered only in a different conceptual scheme. Paradoxically, Davidson tells us that we should abandon the distinction between scheme and content, but in doing so we are not setting a different paradigm? Evidently for Davidson does not exist a conceptual scheme, or at least his definition is not as usual. We'll see how to address this issue difficult but exciting at the end of the entire work. Only possess a clear idea of \u200b\u200bthe system of Japanese thought we could make comparisons. For the moment we try to define the conceptual diversity along the Japanese tell us what the philosophers and scholars in Japan. At the end we will draw the appropriate conclusions. For the moment, however, is useful to define how it is possible to communicate between different conceptual schemes overcome the problems of unintelligibility.
Ludwig Wittgenstein had already shown by implication that there could be communication between different conceptual schemes when he proposed the example of the beetle in a box (See Philosophical Investigations, Par 293). Communication can take place even if the concept of a beetle is different, if our experiences are different, even if our box is empty. "Use a word without justification does not mean to use it without having the right," he says clearly Wittgenstein (ibid., Para 289). The sharing of a few linguistic elements still allows the continuation of the conversation, regardless of the opinions, beliefs, and then dagli schemi concettuali. Wittgenstein, infatti, riconosce la comprensione (condivisione dei giudizi e delle credenze) come un passo ulteriore della comunicazione (Ibidem, Par. 242). La comunicazione non è affatto l'approdo finale del linguaggio, è soltanto il cominciamento.
Riguardo ai problemi di traduzione della lingua giapponese, molti autori giapponesi ne hanno scritto a bizzeffe. Il problema, come sempre, è che la maggior parte di questi testi non sono stati tradotti in lingue occidentali e sono rimasti sconosciuti sia in Europa che in America. Qui citiamo il bel libro, semplice ed essenziale, di Morimoto Tetsuro intitolato Nihongo omote to ura (La lingua giapponese, davanti e dietro) (2). Il titolo è già significativo, meaning that there is a facade, the superficial aspects of language, but also a behind, the deep and hidden aspects that are difficult to perceive. Despite these supposed difficulties, Moritomo provides a very simple and natural that explains the language in alliance with the Japanese sensibility would be part of everyday life.
According to the Japanese, the Japanese language difficulties are due to a perception of reality totally different. But as we said before, this difference depends on the fundamentals (in Japanese Kiso) of thought and its logical laws. If the differences of meaning and beliefs that are found in the Japanese thought that only the emergence of a huge iceberg, differenze che nascono dai fondamenti e dall'elaborazione del pensiero, ossia dalle strutture e leggi logiche, preoccuparsi solo dell'aspetto interpretativo dei significati e delle credenze senza capire da dove scaturiscano è abbastanza limitativo.
Per questo motivo abbiamo scelto di rispolverare la teoria weberiana che non è stata mai usata in ambito epistemologico con la portata e le conclusioni che noi stiamo ottenendo(3). Franco Ferrarotti ha sostenuto che Max Weber sia stato tremendamente sottovalutato(4). Anche noi siamo di questo avviso e intendiamo dimostrarlo utilizzando il metodo weberiano in maniera nuova e pratica.
Il "comprendere" (verstehen) è per Max Weber un processo che utilizza gli schemi concettuali diversi With the principle dell'avalutività. In contrast, the interpretation seems to be a process of accommodation between our conceptual scheme and verbal expression. We have said from the beginning that we renounce our conceptual framework to try to grasp the rationality of Japanese, following the example of the method outlined by Weber. In such a way that groped to "understand" rather than "play."
The only way to get hold of a conceptual scheme is to use it. Groped to limit the problems of translation, using some easy way we would fall into error. In this regard, the Japanese are right in criticizing the West for their superficiality when they approach to culture and society Japanese. The
the western criticism of superficiality and arrogance comes from the finding of an attitude that ignores the existence of a feeling and thinking differently. Or worse, the label as a "lower diversity" that is destined to disappear overwhelmed by western progress.
would be part of philosophy, including Ludwig Wittgenstein had realized that the danger was to confuse the practice with the interpretation (5). When we talk to a partner, we expect to have an appropriate behavior to our expectations, not that it undertakes to interpret his words according to our conceptual scheme. Just as when we order a dish the waiter we expect to be served and wait a speech of appreciation on our refined tastes. This is the difference between practice and interpretation that was shown repeatedly taken up and elaborated by Wittgenstein and Austin's (6).
why we reject the idea of \u200b\u200b"interpret" through our conceptual scheme, not least because it seems inconsistent with the ordinary language philosophy of Wittgenstein, Austin and Grice. If the word is also action, using different words often but not always, means to perform different actions. Many times we have quoted directly in terms of many Japanese with the intent to show the diversity of use of the word. Wittgenstein is teaching us that the meaning is the use of a word. If we used directly una nostra o altre traduzioni, avremmo forse fornito un'idea falsa su quei termini.
Il problema dell'inintelligibilità degli schemi concettuali è ripreso anche da Richard Rorty nel saggio Il mondo finalmente perduto(7). Il suggestivo titolo intende con "mondo perduto" quello del realista ingenuo. In questo saggio, egli analizza la posizione di Davidson e Stroud nei confronti dello "schema concettuale alternativo". Partendo da Hegel e Kant fino a giungere a Heidegger e Dewey, tracciando una particolare storia della filosofia nello stile tipico di Rorty, si descrivono le possibilità che provengono dall'accettazione dell'esistenza di uno schema concettuale alternativo.
Rorty è concorde con Davidson circa l'inintelligibilità the conceptual alternative is to use a series of examples. Among the many bizarre situations proposed by Rorty, one looks very similar to our case, and that is what the inhabitants of the planet Mongo. They have an alternative conceptual framework which would include a different concept of morality, art, science, etc.. If we replaced the example of Rorty "planet Mongo" by "Japanese society", we would be in a situation not dissimilar. The fact that Rorty resorts to imaginary examples drawn from science fiction and does not cite specific cases available and documented, it seems indicative of the need not to be confused with the theoretical examples that require detailed studies.
fact the conclusion of Rorty is not the emergence of a single conceptual framework, assumptions also promptly rejected by Davidson, but the hope of overcoming of idealism and realism.
"But if we come to consider both the theory of coherence is that of comparability of trivia not antagonistic, then we can finally go beyond realism and idealism. We can reach a point where, to quote Wittgenstein, we can to stop doing philosophy when and how we want. " (8)
Here Rorty suggests a solution similar to that of Davidson: The need for a different philosophical paradigm. It seems clear that these authors indicate that there are issues about the conceptual framework would depend on bad definitions of philosophy, what Wittgenstein meant as pseudo-problems. These difficulties should be resolved in a different philosophical system.
For the present work, we decided to follow the Japanese thought from the beginning to the end, and also in respect of these issues we choose to study the Japanese solution. Only by knowing the Japanese philosophical position we can say if it fits into a framework that already exists in the Western tradition, if you have a relationship with the positions of contemporary epistemology and how different and propose again.
But reflection can not miss. The Japanese philosophy (9), with its magnificent development of twelve centuries by Kobo Daishi in Nishida Kitaro, has nothing to envy to the American philosophy, with its lively two centuries by Ralph Waldo Emerson to John Dewey. Perhaps it is ridiculous to continue to support the development of the Japanese philosophy is not affected by the intellectual limits. Also because there are very few Western scholars who have studied contemporary philosophy in Japan. So it is foolish to judge what you do not know.
More interesting is, looking from the Japanese point of view, discover the contortions that afflict Western thought. Continuously listen to various speeches on globalization of the planet. For once we make sure that this globalization and integration also take place with the philosophy. If this world should have no more borders, but they must be slaughtered in our own minds. In this case perhaps right when he sees Hashizume Ludwig Wittgenstein in a rebellion against the Western thought (10). It is not completely reckless recognize the last development of the thought of Wittgenstein's abandonment of truth-functional logic in favor of the language game, the similarities of family and follow a rule (11).
If we were to deliver our vision of the development of Japanese philosophy, it seems to me that the Japanese philosophers are those parties that were the final destinations of Western philosophy: rejection of the principle of non-contradiction (Hegel) and abandonment of truth-functional logic (Wittgenstein).
We realize that to say that the Japanese thought obeys other laws of logic is so disruptive as to constitute a Copernican revolution of today's concept of rationality. Until now it was a common idea that the laws of logic were universal, and even if the philosophy has amply demonstrated the existence of logic "other", it was not considered too much credit with the possibility that human beings use different logics ( 12).
Nobody has bothered to check the logical laws of human thought except ethnologists. But the fact that the work of ethnologists were conducted on primitive peoples, has labeled quel tipo di pensiero come pre-logico, ossia in una fase antecedente e dunque non ancora sviluppato. In questa maniera l'epistemologia ha volutamente ignorato dei risultati scientifici screditandoli (13).
Il caso giapponese è però differente. Nonostante si tenti di spiegare ancora il pensiero giapponese come il residuo di una mentalità tradizionale, ipotesi che ormai non regge più davanti all'evidenza, si sta dimostrando l'infondatezza di tutte le teorie che si limitano a definire la differenza come culturale. Noi affermiamo che esiste una razionalità giapponese con sue precise leggi e intendiamo anche individuarle.
Il problema della razionalità giapponese ha degli epigoni che non possono essere trascurati. Le alternative contemplate are two. Or what we are saying is completely unfounded, and therefore we're telling the biggest canard that has ever been held in a scientific field (using an expression in English: "the pie in the sky"). In that case we should be used on an incredible imagination, and it would therefore take the opportunity to fly immediately changing profession, moving from philosophy to storytelling.
Or we could find a crucial point that calls into question the well established concept of rationality. Understand which of the two alternatives is correct, it is very important from a scientific point of view. If what we are saying is wrong, it means that it is more plausible a logical form of thought one universal. And this is a remarkable scientific achievement. Otherwise, we must note, giving reason to our thesis that there is a plurality of the logical basis of human action.
4.2 Sayonara to the principle of non-contradiction
Since the principle of non-contradiction of one of the basic logic of Western thought, it is natural that it is also one of the claims. The most authoritative critics of the principle of non-contradiction in contemporary Japanese philosophy was expounded by Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945).
Nishida's thought is not an isolated attempt to process the Japanese philosophy, but on the contrary, owes much German idealist philosophy, especially Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, but also to Kant, Hume, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Lotze and Hartmann (we have some documentation in the diaries and correspondence that we bear witness to its interests) (14 ). We know what
Nishida was involved in the study of philosophical texts in Europe, it has become legendary figure of his scholar who spent his nights immersed in reading. There is therefore no reason for surprise if you find Nishida in a revival of Hegel in opposition to the principle of non-contradiction (15).
For Nishida, the contradiction is part of the dialectic of reality. Since the constitutive contradiction of being, it can not be regarded as something apart. The contradiction should not be excluded from reality, so how do you interpret the common sense, as it is placed just inside. So Nishida test a real sense of rejection of the contradiction as presented by the Western tradition. It also showed how Löwith, we had to wait Hegel and Nietzsche to happen because a profound change in philosophy in the West.
The historical fact that for thousands of European philosophy has remained unchanged in principle, can not pass unnoticed. And the thought that these forms of thought have come to join the common Western thought. This sedimentation has become so deep and old to pass unnoticed. Finally, it is believed that certain things were actually a reflection of reality.
While the West was settled this situation, Japan's philosophy turned its attention to itself. Miki Kiyoshi, a student of Nishida, is the author of a unique philosophical text entitled Kosoryoku no ronri (16) (The logic of the conception of thought) which examines the historical development of ideas in the world and their ability to interact with reality.
So the strength of the principle of non-contradiction has more historical reasons and logical-philosophical. Nishida was fully aware of this and decided to use a terminology that distinguished the Western logic by logic Japanese. He coined the term toyoteki ronri, literally "Eastern logic." Here there is no question of translation as the word means ronri logic, and indicates precisely the logic as understood in the West, namely the study of the conditions of correct reasoning.
In Nishida's thought there were several stages of evolution. The latter is formed by the development of a "logic of place" (basho no ronri), an alternative to traditional Western logic and reworking of contemporary philosophical thought. The logic of place (basho no ronri) also means "the identity of contradictions" (mujunteki Doitsu). In fact, according to Nishida one and the many points of view are only two of the same reality (17).
He also speaks of a determination of a linear and circular determination, which are also different aspects of the same reality. Nishida discusses the concept of space and time. The common thought sees time as linear, it goes from past to future. But if the past is what has been, and the future is what is to come, this, given the past and the future, it makes no sense.
This can not be determined from past and future in this way. What we know is only the present moment. Thus, the present, past and future exist simultaneously. Since simultaneity is the characteristic of space, according to Nishida also time and space. Quindi il tempo può essere determinato in due modi, l'uno lineare, rappresentato da una linea verticale, l'altro da uno spazio orizzontale, rappresentato da un cerchio che si chiude. "L'esterno è l'interno, l'interno è l'esterno, l'uno è il molteplice, il molteplice è l'uno" è l'affermazione che Nishida ritiene essenziale. Se per Kant, il tempo è il senso interno e lo spazio il senso esterno, allora, secondo Nishida, l'interno sarà la forma dentro il tempo e l'esterno la forma dentro lo spazio.
La logica del luogo propone un'alternativa alla concezione lineare del tempo considerando il tempo in modo spaziale e circolare. In questa maniera anche le operazione logiche sono stravolte. Il modus ponens, for example, implies a linearity that Nishida's logic does not give so easily. Nishida will not stop an epistemic evaluation, but extend these observations to the historical and social considerations. The opposition individual / company will be given to internal and external relations, therefore an identity.
As you can see, the abandonment of the principle of contradiction provides a rejection of the principle of identity. In Nishida's philosophical system is very clear exposition contradictory identity that is unthinkable without sacrificing the principle of identity. Specifically we will see in the next paragraph, the refusal by the Japanese philosophy of the principle of identity. After
Nishida other major Japanese philosophers have followed this distinction between Western logic (which is taking the principle of non-contradiction) and Eastern logic (which is not accepted the principle of non-contradiction). Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945), a student of Nishida, developed a highly original logic speculative. Based on studies by Pascal (18), and recognize the distinction between spirit and spirit de finesse de géométrie, Miki tried to develop a logical alternative to the logic of reason to explain the power of ideas put to work in the formation of world history. Kosoryoku no ronri (The logic of the conception of thought) (19) is the most significant work that makes This philosophical view of Miki. Even
Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) departed from the logic nishidiana to criticize the Western logic. But the initial formation of Tanabe is also heavily imbued with interests in philosophy of science. In studies devoted to the philosophy of science, as gairon Kagaku (Introduction to the Philosophy of Science) (20), he proves to maneuver skillfully in epistemology. But as has happened to other Japanese philosophers, you will soon realize that Western logic is not compatible with Japanese thinking.
For Tanabe, like Nishida, the contradiction is resolved in an indissoluble unity. But Tanabe stands out immediately from the proposed solutions by Nishida, and produces a logic alternative. The intent of Tanabe is clearly to oppose the solution nishidiana proposing a new development. According to Hajime Tanabe
philosophy must provide mediation between philosophical logic and irrationality of reality. We can not be content to remain spectators of the contradictions of the world. This logic will be the "dialectic of absolute mediation" (no Zettai baikai benshoho). The "logic of species" (shu no ronri) developed by Tanabe replaces the "logic of place" Nishida. According
Tanabe, Nishida mistake when analyzing the individual and the universal regardless of who is mediating between these species (shu). Tanabe believes that it has corrected the logic Nishida, but still considered a follower of the philosopher of Kamakura. Tanabe through the "logic of species" comes to a historical-political definition of the state that would be a mediator between the universal, the individual and the culture. So
Tanabe believes he has given substance to the logic of Nishida that are likely to remain too abstract. But the events of the war deeply impressed that Tanabe will submit its system to be reviewed. He claims to have given too much importance to the nation-state, forgetting the point of departure. Again, no
Shu ronri no benshi (The logic of the dialectic of species) (21) have expressed these thoughts. In his self-criticism, Tanabe will say that his logic was too imbued with the principle of identity, ignoring the relativization of each perspective (what Nishida had done superbly).
Therefore he will land with no tetsugaku Zangedo Toshie (Philosophy as a penance) (22) to a philosophy that shows the limits of reason with respect to existence. In this work, Tanabe shows evil as an absolute good perspective of the individual. Instead, see and recognize the diversity would be an act of freedom that would allow for the peaceful existence of human beings. The story of philosophical
Tanabe is therefore troubled. The game ends in a science studies approach to life. But he leaves us un sistema che ammette una logica alternativa e le implicazioni etiche e storiche che ne derivano.
Anche Takahashi Satomi (1886-1964), autore di un saggio su Edmund Husserl(23) e traduttore di Henri Bergson(24), si è occupato della logica giapponese. Takahashi riconosceva diversi sistemi dialettici e ne tentò una sintesi. I risultati sono raccolti nella sua opera dedicata a questo problema specifico: Ho benshoho (La dialettica avvolgente)(25). La dialettica di Takahashi Satomi ingloba la dialettica hegeliana, la dialettica nishidiana, ma anche la logica formale, in un tentativo audace e inusitato di sintesi. Così come espresso dal suo nome, "dialettica avvolgente" comprende tutte le dialettiche elaborate dalle filosofie occidentali e orientali.
La proposta di Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960) è ancora più originale(26). Egli afferma in Fudo: ningengakuteki kosatu (Il clima: analisi della natura umana) che esiste uno stretto rapporto fra la natura e il carattere umano. L'influenza dei diversi climi porterebbe alla formazione di culture diverse (27). Watsuji riconosce un clima del tifone, un clima del deserto, un clima della prateria che corrispondono alle culture estremo-orientale, medio-orientale e occidentale.
La fine sensibilità e passionalità, il senso di rassegnazione nei confronti destino, la dignità, la tenacia del giapponese sono comprensibili, secondo Watsuji, attraverso l'influenza del clima del tifone. Watsuji, comunque, non tralascia to say that human existence is also strongly influenced by social relations. The thought of Watsuji, then flows into a philosophical system that determines the man as a product of two forces, one natural and one social. In this system, as in that of Miki, the laws of thought are the product of environmental processes, historical and social. So the principles of logic are not regarded as absolute and independent reality. Even Risaku
Mutai (1890-1974) sought to construct a logic for the Eastern thought. Party by the intention to develop a logic to the thought of Nishida (28), Mutai noticed the amplitude of its work and the implications deriving from it. Mutai criticizes the view that the logic Western represents the correct way of thinking (29). According to Mutai, the Western logic is simply a building that is congenial to the Western way of thinking. In this suit opposing a logic of intuition. In another paragraph we shall see in detail what is meant by logical intuition. Nishida also spoke often of intuition, and so is the other Japanese philosophers.
will try to provide an explanation of what in a more formal and less tied to the discourse of Japanese philosophy, so as to avoid the reader a thorough study of the ancient philosophical tradition in Japan.
In this chapter we have shown the positions of some Japanese philosophers on the question the logical form. According to these authors there is no "universal logic." And surely it is not that developed and offered in Europe and America. The Western logic is only one among many possible forms of logic.
4.3 The forbidden fruit of the principle of identity
To use a biblical image, Western philosophy has eaten the forbidden fruit of the principle of identity. But the Eastern philosophy is not occurred in this incident. To be precise, the acceptance of the principle of identity that says that everything is equal to itself, was not accepted so obvious even in the West, until it was, exactly, bite the forbidden fruit. And with that, the man kicked out of Eden was believed to have acquired the knowledge.
Before this incident, the condition of philosophy was different. Heraclitus said that you could not swim in the same river twice, and also many sophisticated positions, such as Gorgias, Protagoras, Zeno, were based on a relativism which does not seem to accept the principle of identity. With Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, a trio certainly enviable, the music changed radically. Socrates insisted on precise definitions and rigorous rebuttals that were using was not adequate to fulfill the principle of identity.
Plato linked the material bodies to ideas, establishing their identity permanently. Aristotle constructed a logic which laid down the principle of identity and other rules that could not help it.
But the beginning of the twentieth century has seen call into question the principle of identity by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The fact that we had to wait a couple of millennia before we criticize the principle of identity is quite staggering. But one can understand the situation if you appreciate the intellectual capacities of the terrible trio composed of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Think freely without the influence of the prodigious trio was quite difficult for Westerners. It still is.
Wittgenstein was placed in a very simple first bite of the forbidden fruit, we should know che cosa stiamo per mangiare. Cos'è realmente il principio di identità? Wittgenstein afferma che è qualcosa di superfluo.
"Che l'identità non sia una relazione fra oggetti è evidente. [...] La definizione, data da Russell di " = " non basta; infatti, secondo essa, non si può dire che due oggetti abbiano in comune tutte le proprietà. [...] Detto approssimativamente: dire di due cose, che esse siano identiche, è un nonsenso; e dire di una cosa che essa sia identica a se stessa, non dice nulla. [...] Il segno d'equivalenza non è dunque parte costitutiva essenziale dell'ideografia." (30)
Con il Tractatus, Wittgenstein ricacciava fuori dalla logica formale il principle of identity. Obviously, the logical Westerners were quick in trying to prove that Wittgeinstein it only joking. Then he received a number of neutralization, but not all with the same range and same implications. The positions are very different and correspond to today's philosophical landscape.
The historical situation that sees a variety of current is indeed due to their inability to provide a unified response to the logical problems raised at the beginning of the twentieth century. Certainly the principle of identity also requires a capacity for abstraction that makes absolute, and then separated from reality, an aspect of the phenomenal world. But it is difficult to argue that there is an immutable reality and that something remains absolutely unchangeable. Therefore, in an attempt to build a logic that was the Tractatus picture of the world, Wittgenstein claims that the principle of identity has no reason for being. Moreover, these philosophical problems have repercussions not religious indifference.
Westerners have always had a bad relationship with the idea of \u200b\u200bdeath. The fact that they do not accept easily its transient nature is indicative of a conception of immutable. The insistence on the expectation of an afterlife was perfect so the impact of that approach.
Eastern religions use the image instead of reincarnation (in Japanese Tensei) to indicate the ever-changing existence. To a Westerner it is still difficult to give up his identity and admit the vanity of his personality.
These observations show the effectiveness of the method of Weber. The beliefs are not only an accessory device, but the manifestation of the mechanisms of different forms of thought. If we can bring back the attitudes and social action in a pattern of thought we caught ("including" Weber would say) that the rationality of the social system.
As indicated by Japanese philosophers, such as choosing a logical principle of identity is not only a formal problem, the historical and social implications are. So in Japan it is theorized con la filosofia contemporanea un diverso sistema logico. Da questa elaborazione dipendeva l'esistenza stessa del sistema culturale e sociale giapponese.
Difendere la specificità del pensiero giapponese è stato il più grande risultato raggiunto dalla filosofia giapponese nel XX secolo.
Quando si può affermare la propria indipendenza intellettuale, tutti gli attacchi alla propria identità culturale sono vani.
4.4 La rigidità del principio di non-contraddizione
Blaise Pascal è un pensatore a torto trascurato, essendogli riservato spesso uno spazio limitato nei manuali di filosofia. In Giappone, invece, è stato al centro di importanti studi da parte di Miki Kiyoshi che lo riteneva un autore fondamentale (31).
This preliminary observation is needed to understand the existence of a tradition of Western philosophy that studies are completely ignored in Europe and America. There is a history of philosophy is still unknown that waits only to be brought to light.
Perhaps we have assumed that it is not. You can not say that the history of philosophy is complete until it is supplemented by the work of Japanese scholars.
As we said earlier, is a philosopher Pascal neglected, and often forgets what he was rooted in the spirit of mathematical and logical. So many of his statements are read only from the religious point of view. In this
so has escaped most of the performers a claim that Pascal is not just about morals, but it was a genuine critique of the principle of non-contradiction.
"Contradiction is a bad brand of truth. Many things certain are contradicted. Many false pass without contradiction. Neither the contradiction is the mark of falsehood or contradiction is not the mark of truth." (32)
Another thought is still false:
"Imagination. It is the dominant part of man, that mistress of error and falsehood, and all the more treacherous than ever it is, since it is infallible rule of Indeed, if it were infallible lie. "(33)
The second of these thoughts is the solution of outright liar paradox that has haunted generations of logic to arrive at more sophisticated forms proposed by Bertrand Russell (34).
Pascal argues strongly that the contradiction is not possible to determine the truth. One can not say that a proposition is false because contradictory, and vice versa is not true because contradictory. It also appears that Pascal does not accept the use of the logical negation of how it is taught by tradition .
So the negation of a truth is not always a lie and vice versa. If it seems strange that the denial of a proposition does not provide the truth value of reverse is the case to reflect a bit 'with some examples.
There is a funny way to present a case of ambiguity by saying that "a glass is half empty" or "a glass is half full." Apparently the two statements express opposing concepts, but in fact describe the same physical phenomenon. Using this example we build two propositions: "The glass is not half empty, half full" and "The glass is half full, half empty."
This is an ambiguity that does not allow a unique opinion. One could say that both are true? But it should be noted that the second is the negation of the first perfect. In case this is not always the negation di un proposizione fornisce un valore di verità inverso. E non si può dire che esistano sempre situazioni in cui determinare il valore di verità sia ovvio.
La vita concreta offre più spesso situazioni intermedie e quasi mai degli estremi. Affrontare la realtà vedendo le cose in due soli modi, bianco o nero, è alquanto pericoloso e irrealistico. La logica usa un criterio binario della verità, ma gli esseri umani sono costretti a usare strutture logiche ben meno rigide.
Il secondo esempio è il più eloquente ed è quello del paradosso del mentitore: "Io sono un mentitore". Questa affermazione è vera o falsa? Se usiamo una struttura rigida della verità cadiamo nel paradosso. Ma se ascoltiamo il suggerimento Pascal, considering that lying is not always false otherwise infallible rule of truth, the paradox disappears.
And so is the reality: we are in front of the confession of a liar or a joke of an honest. As we shall also John McDowell (35), the solution lies in context and not in the sentence. There is no paradox if you choose well the evaluation criteria.
Today we can formalize these observations of Pascal, which was not possible in his time. If we then consider these recommendations without delay, not accepting the negation operator as an inverse function, we gain four truth tables corresponding to the different possible worlds (36).
p ~ p
------
VFV
FVF
p ~ p
------ VVV
FFF
p ~ p
------ VVV
FVF
p ~ p
------
VFV
FFF
Using these tables to the negation operator along with the connective junction is obtained:
p ^ ~ p -----
-
VFFV
FFVF
p ^ ~ p
------- VVVV
FFFF
p ^ ~ P
------- VVVV
FFVF
p ^ ~ p -------
VFFV
FFFF
The first table corresponds to the classical principle of non-contradiction, the other three consequences of Pascal's logic. As Pascal says, the contradiction would not be "brand of falsehood" (marque de fausse) and non-contradiction "brand truth" (marque de vérité). Following the tables derived from the observation of Pascal shows that the truth of the conjunction connective can be contradicted, and falsehood is always challenged. Faced with the contradiction do not know if we are in presence of a truth or a lie, even though the odds are that it is a lie higher. Pascal would suggest that a probabilistic view of truth is not an unreasonable assumption when one considers the subject of the bet and all its related studies. In conclusion, the truth can not be inferred by the contradiction that can only speak of falsehood.
An example can show the validity of Pascal's logic. We will also try to be faithful to the explanation of the French philosopher that we first reported. Let's see what happens with the deduction: "The fish has fins and lives in the water," "The dolphin has fins and lives in the water," "The dolphin is a fish."
In these propositions the first and second are true, but the third is true according to the logic, while the second is false reality. If we assume the traditional logic commit a wrong inference that we try to avoid the contradiction (the dolphin's fins and lives in water, but is not a fish), considering that the contradiction is the enemy of truth. Only non-rigid
use of negation and the principle of non-contradiction, as indicated by Blaise Pascal, we can not know a fallacy. In fact, the logic Pascal admits the contradiction where none is permitted by the traditional logic. In this case, Pascal's logic is closer to reality. The
conventional wisdom had instead provided a formulation of the contradiction was too oriented to exclusion. It was so unique that both the principle of non-contradiction was considered insufficient and approached from the principle of excluded middle.
course, as the logicians know, you tried to solve these problems with a more careful use of quantifiers. But all that has come to complicate the situation with the flaps fully described in history textbooks of logic. Quantifiers can be used correctly if we have a perfect knowledge of the sets on which we are operating. But against the reality we do not have a complete knowledge of the elements that compose it. Seeking to safeguard logica dandole uno statuto assoluto che la ponesse in un mondo separato da quello reale non è stata una soluzione soddisfacente. Che scopo avrebbe una scienza che non abbia alcun rapporto con la realtà? La matematica e la geometria hanno avuto nascita e sviluppo da esigenze molto concrete. Difficilmente si può accettare di chiamare scienza ciò che si distacca dalla realtà. Si è mai visto qualcosa che è conoscenza di ciò che non è nella realtà?
Ma cosa ha a che fare tutto ciò con il modo di ragionare dei giapponesi? Qui abbiamo voluto formalizzare ciò che adesso vedremo descritto in termini più discorsivi. Questa premessa era necessaria perché il livello di complessità a cui ci stiamo accostando is growing and we need more and more refined logical tools to grab the Japanese rationality.
We said in the introduction that also address the issue of diversity Japanese would have involved the questioning of the concept of rationality. And so far we have respected what you said.
4.5 The Japanese form of truth
In carrying out our exploration adventure, we often have the chance to meet other travelers that we are precious gifts. This time it's up to Karl Löwith. In 1936 the German philosopher Karl Löwith, to escape racial persecution, lived in Japan, where he taught until 1941 at the University of Sendai, anno in cui il Giappone entrò in guerra.
Questa esperienza di Löwith non fu marginale, ma influenzò non poco la sua concezione della storia della filosofia, soprattutto nella sua critica all'impostazione teologica ebraico-cristiana. Ciò gli fu possibile grazie all'esperienza in Giappone che gli aveva permesso di vedere la filosofia occidentale in modo distaccato e diverso.
Löwith fu un attento osservatore del mondo giapponese e scrisse interessanti saggi sulla mentalità dei giapponesi, attualmente riordinati e pubblicati in maniera più unitaria (37).
Löwith afferma che la verità giapponese non coincide con la verità occidentale. Ma soprattutto è l'uso che si fa del concetto di verità che è totally different. "In Japan, however, the kindness - or rather a conventional lie - it is the policy of what we call truth," he says Löwith (38).
He adds that the Japanese are "incapable of responding adequately to requests for they are too direct and aggressive." So the truth is something that is negotiated: "That the truth we must openly express a personal opinion reflecting, in the eyes of the Japanese is a sign of rudeness and selfishness, because it does not take into account the feelings of the other minimum. A truth traded in a sociable atmosphere facilitates reciprocity in tacit agreement on the rules of the game. " But above all
Löwith clearly indicates there is truth to the Japanese: "For them the whole truth is a pragmatic thing, which can be modified to reflect the actual situation."
Löwith gives us a definition of truth is essential that the Japanese really meaningful for our model of understanding of Japanese thought. The truth is based on a Western adaequatio rei et intellectus, a comparison and comparison with reality, but the truth is in relation to the Japanese community of individuals in whom it is shared. The report is completely different.
Truth western
Adequacy
The truth is the reality one
The truth is outside the subject
The assessment criterion is related to the facts
Truth Japanese
Using instrumental
Truths are many
The truth is internal to the subject
The assessment criterion is related to the community
Japanese
The truth can not use the criterion of adaequatio rei et intellectus because, as we saw earlier, there is no concept of reality as the West. The reality of the Japanese is its soul and its feel, nothing else.
Since there is no objective reality, there can be no objective truth. So the truth is something che è contrattato. Il risultato è una concezione relativistica della verità.
Questa concezione del relativismo della verità ha avuto un'esposizione artistica nel celeberrimo film Rashomon di Kurosawa Akira (39). Kurosawa mise in scena alcuni episodi tratti dall'omonimo libro di Akutagawa Ryunosuke (40). Uno di questi episodi è quello del racconto intitolato Yabu no naka (Nella boscaglia).
In un bosco è stato trovato il cadavere di un samurai, e per il delitto sono processati il bandito Tajomaru e la moglie del samurai. Essi sono interrogati. Il bandito dice di aver aggredito la coppia e di aver legato il samurai. Dopo aver avuto un amplesso con la donna, fu ella a suggerirgli di uccidere l'uomo e di scappare insieme. La moglie del samurai afferma invece che dopo essere stata violata, il marito la guardava con disprezzo. Ella lo uccise per punirlo. Ma attraverso una sciamana viene interrogato anche lo spirito del samurai. Il samurai dice di essersi ucciso per disperazione e per riscattare l'onore perso dopo aver visto la donna mettersi d'accordo con il bandito. Chi mente? Dov'è la verità nei tre racconti? La morale di questa vicenda è che "ricordiamo solo quello che ci fa comodo, e ci abbellisce agli occhi degli altri" (41).
Questo film di Kurosawa ebbe un enorme successo, tanto da essere premiato con il Leone d'oro nel settembre 1951. Per noi ha un immenso valore perché è la rappresentazione artistica del concetto di verità giapponese descritto da Löwith. Forse questa è la prima volta che si usa un film come documentazione di un trattato filosofico, ma noi siamo figli dei nostri tempi e sappiamo quanto sia forte l'influenza della cinematografia nella nostra epoca.
4.6 Uso della negazione nella lingua giapponese
Non sempre una negazione porta a un valore di verità contrario. Sarebbe forse sorprendente se si ritrovasse questo aspetto nella lingua giapponese? In effetti le cose stanno proprio così. La negazione nella lingua giapponese non è così forte come nelle lingue occidentali. Questo appare evidente, per esempio, nell'uso delle espressioni "mi piace" e "non mi piace".
Nel giapponese esistono due verbi: suki (essere piacevole) e kirai (essere sgradevole). But the denial of suki does not fully correspond to Kira.
Say "ringo ga suki dewanai" (I do not like apples) does not mean that apples are undesirable, but simply that they are not among the favorite fruit (like that). So it is very likely that the other person eat the apples. While saying "ringo ga kira by" (apples I unwelcome), is to reject and then do not eat apples.
These differences begin to grow up in a real conversation, when you express your thoughts. The Japanese are surprised to learn that in Italian, "not like" (suki dewanai) corresponds to "unwelcome" (Kira by).
formalize this aspect of Japanese thought using suki and Kira.
Expression Findings
suki from (+ + +)
suki dewanai (+ / -)
dewanai kira (- / +)
by kira (- - -)
With "by suki" means a preference for that thing with "suki dewanai" that there is a preference, with "kira dewanai" which is not unwelcome, then with "Kira from" there is unwelcome. These four expressions are each very different according to the Japanese.
As in the formalization of the logic of Pascal, even here we get a scheme with four outputs. The fact that repetition of this "fourfold path" is not casual, but has an internal reason. Not accepting the denial as the operator che fornisce il valore inverso di quello dato, si finisce per sdoppiare i valori di verità di una proposizione che nella logica tradizionale potevano essere solo due.
Quello che può sorprendere è invece la corrispondenza fra logica pascaliana e lingua giapponese. Löwith diceva che la verità giapponese è pragmatica, quindi non dobbiamo stupirci se la forma logica che essa assume è quella quadruplice e non quella binaria della logica tradizionale e classica (che ha avuto il massimo sviluppo con la logica booleana).
Che la negazione non sia usata come nelle lingue occidentali ci è indicato anche da altri studiosi. Come segnalato dallo psicologo Paul Watzlawick(42), il pensiero occidentale ha una tendenza al ragionamento per negazioni (es.: se non è così, allora...), cosa che non avviene con frequenza nel pensiero giapponese(43).
4.7 Il principio dell'ombra
Finora abbiamo esposto quello che il pensiero giapponese non è, esponendo le diversità dal pensiero occidentale. Adesso possiamo dire anche quel che è. Eliminati il principio di identità e il principio di non-contraddizione, dobbiamo necessariamente trovare altri principi che siano alla base della logica giapponese. La ricerca non è difficile, considerando che i filosofi giapponesi hanno dedicato tutti i loro sforzi per individuare questi principi.
Come abbiamo visto in precedenza, Nishida, Tanabe e Mutai hanno fatto riferimento a una certa "logica dell'intuizione". We prefer to use a sociological approach to the theory of communication to clarify as what science may appear dark using the language of these authors.
So we will use an alternative definition to that provided by Japanese philosophers. This is not because there is a difference, but for simple reasons of exposition and simplification. That is why we refer to the concept of "tacit knowledge".
The concept of "tacit knowledge" has been developed in anthropology and sociology to denote the set of knowledge and beliefs shared by a community that is used implicitly, without prior exposure of the rules. Sociological theories that refer all'interazionismo symbolic allowed to develop an alternative model to the regulatory environment (eg. Durkheim).
In these models, there is no system of rules, values, status, roles that would guide the action of the individual, but it is born dall'autointerazione (44). All the latest sociological models have questioned the existence of a system of explicit rules which guide the actions of the individual. That said it is easier to understand the concept of tacit knowledge.
It is always said that the Eastern character to hide things by being so mysterious and inscrutable. In this respect there is an important work that describes in detail this feature in Japan. It
Tanizaki's book entitled Jun'ichiro In'ei raisan (Praise the shadow) (45). According to the sensitivity and expressiveness Tanizaki Japanese born in the shadow, or in hiding.
This principle can be reported in the shadow of the discourse on the logical form of Japanese thought. Only the shadow principle can explain the reasoning mechanisms without the principle of identity and non-contradiction that we have previously explained. Indeed
principle of shadow on the one hand, and principles of identity and non-contradiction, on the other, are two divergent paths. The principles of logical form Japanese are irreconcilable with the Western principles. Is there really an alternative logic of Eastern thought.
Japanese philosophers have continually repeated and insisted on the existence of an intuitive knowledge. Unfortunately it is not a philosophical language that would make understandable this evanescent concept of tacit knowledge. Today they are at our disposal tools and theories of communication that allow us to capture and make accessible the concepts that were elusive to the Japanese philosophers.
In this chapter we have shown that there is a logical alternative to Western logic. This rule rejects the negation of the principle of identity and the principle of non-contradiction. These principles were replacing an intuitive principle, the principle of the shadow, which allows the formulation of opinions through interaction with reality.
The concept of truth developed by Japanese Löwith provided a clearer explanation of the principle of shadow and how they are actually made in reviews of Japanese thought. Everything seems to indicate not only that there is a Japanese form of rationality, but these funds so that the entire cognitive system to have its own laws of logic.
Notes 1. Regarding the position of Davidson read: Davidson, D., Inquieres into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984. (Trad. it. Davidson, D., Truth and Interpretation, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1994). For the notion of "conceptual scheme": Davidson, D., On the very idea of \u200b\u200ba conceptual scheme, in "Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association," No 47, 1974, pp. 5-20 (trad. it. Davidson, D., The turning contemporary relativistic epistemology, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1988, pp. 151-167). In Japan you can see the volume edited by Hiroyuki Hattori and Masayoshi Shibata: Davidson, D., Koi to dekigoto, Keiso Shobo, Tokyo, 1990. There is also a comment to this work of Davidson Kashiwabata, Tatsuya, to Koi no dekigoto sonzairon, Keiso Shobo, Tokyo, 1997.
2. Moritomo, Tetsuro, Nihongo omote to ura, Shinchosha, Tokyo, 1985.
3. Recall that Habermas has provided an extraordinary development of the theory of Weber, but not the epistemology his work was well received: Habermas, Jürgen, Theory of Communicative Action, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1985.
4. See Franco Ferrarotti in the preface to the second edition of Weber, Max, Sociology of religion, UTET, Torino, 1988, pp. 7-11.
5. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Einaudi, Torino, 1967, pp. 9-10 and pp. 102-117.
6. Austin, John L., How to do things with words, Marietti, Genova, 1987, pp. 7-32.
7. Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Pragmatism, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1986, pp. 39-51 (translated Japanese. Yuro by Hisashi: Rorty, Richard, no Tetsugaku datsuochiku: puragumatizumu no kiketsu, Ochanomizu Shobo, Tokyo, 1985).
8. Rorty, Richard, Consequences del pragmatismo, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1986, p. 51.
9. Le opere in lingue occidentali dedicate alla storia della filosofia giapponese sono davvero poche. Consigliamo per la filosofia giapponese contemporanea: Piovesana, G. K., Recent japanese philosophical thought 1862-1962. A survey, Enderle Bookstore, Tokyo, 1963 (trad. it. Piovesana, G. K., Filosofia giapponese contemporanea, Patron, Bologna, 1968), Oe, S., "Japan", in Les grands courants de la pensée mondiale contemporaine, Marzorati, Milano, 2 voll., 1959, pp. 935-963. Per quanto riguarda la filosofia giapponese antica è invece sufficiente consultare i testi dedicati allo zen, per esempio: Hisamatsu, Shin'ichi, La pienezza del nulla, Il Melangolo, Genova, 1993. Obviously, the Japanese text are numerous, here we recall Yura, Tetsuji, Tetsugakushisojiten, Fuji Shoten, Tokyo, 1948.
10. Hashizume, Daisaburo, no Bukkyo gensetsu senryaku, in "Gendaishiso", Special Issue, vols. 13-14, pp. 272-291, Seidosha, Tokyo, 1985.
11. There are many texts that have the affinity between the thought of Wittgenstein and Zen, see: "Wittgenstein and Zen" in Canfield, John V., The philosophy of Wittgenstein, "elective affinities", Vol 15, Garland Publishing, 186 , pp. 383-408 and Wiehnpahl, Paul, Zen and work of Wittgenstein, in "Chicago Review, Vol 12, No 2, 1958, pp. 67-72.
12. For deviant logics, see Marsonet, Michele, Introduction to multi-purpose logic, Abete, Roma, 1976.
13. Only Feyerabend insisted on the plurality of different types of rationality. In this regard it should read Marsonet, Michael, Science and linguistic analysis, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1994, p. 45.
14. Nishida, Kitaro, Nishida Kitaro zenshu bekkan 1, Nikki, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1951, p. 4.
15. The value of the Hegelian dialectic from a logical point of view read Marsonet, Michele, logic and language, Pantograph, Genova, 1993, p. 59.
16. Miki, Kiyoshi, no Kosoryoku ronri, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
17. See Nishida, Kitaro, Nishida Kitaro zenshu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1949, vol. 7, p. 204 and vol. 1, p. 86.
18. Miki, Kiyoshi, Pascal's okeru ningen no kenkyu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1980.
19. Miki, Kiyoshi, no Kosoryoku ronri, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
20. Tanabe, Hajime, gairon Kagaku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1918.
21. Si consulti Tanabe, Hajime, Tanabe Hajime zenshu, Chikuma Shobo, Tokyo, 1976.
22. Tanabe, Hajime, no toshite Zangedo tesugaku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
23. Takahashi, Satomi, no genshogaku Husserl, Nipponsha, Tokyo, 1931.
24. Bergson, Henri, Busshitsu to kioku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1936.
25. Takahashi, Satomi, Ho benshoho, Risosha, Tokyo, 1947.
26. Watsuji, Tetsuro, Tetsuro Watsuji zenshu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1992.
27. Watsuji, Tetsuro, Fudo: ningengakuteki kosatu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1979.
28. Mutai, Risaku, no Basho ronrigaku, Kobundo, Tokyo, 1944.
29. Mutai, Risaku, Shisaku to kansatsu, Keiso Shobo, Tokyo, 1971.
30. These paragraphs 5.5301, 5.5302, 5.5303 and 5533 of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. See Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Einaudi, Torino, 1989, pp. 120-123.
31. Miki, Kiyoshi, Pascal ni okeru ningen no Kenkyu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1980.
32. Pascal, Blaise, Debris, Rizzoli, Milan, 1983, p. 242. Correspond to the thoughts in the catalog Brunschvicg No Catalogue No 384 and Lafuma 177.
33. Ibid 121. Catalogue No Brunschvicg Catalogue No. 82 and Lafuma 44.
34. The problem of the antinomy Russell was of paramount importance for science. It put the project into crisis Frege who tried to found mathematics through logic. And consequently undermined the attempt to Hilbert for a program to formalize mathematical theories. Russell tried to propose a solution to the antinomy with the theory of types. In fact, the Russellian antinomy arises, as he explains, from a problem of set theory. Russell estimated the work of Cantor on set theory, and sought a solution to it, as evidenced by the theory of types. Our solution is based instead on the non-acceptance of pincipi identity and contradiction. Crf. Russell, Bertrand, The Principles of Mathematics, Longanesi, Milan, 1951, pp. 713-721.
35. In recent years, John McDowell has insisted on the principle of contextuality reworking Kant's proposals in its own way. In this regard, see the following report: Bezante, Alexander and Martorella, Christian, on McDowell's essay "De Re Senses", Philosophy of Language (Professor Carlo Penco), Faculty of Humanities, University of Genoa, AA 1998-1999. The proposals are very interesting and original McDowell also discussing the ideas of Evans and Burge. Please read McDowell, John, Mind and World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1996 (trad. it. McDowell, John, Mind and world, Einaudi, Turin, 1999) Evans, Gareth and McDowell, John, Truth and Meaning, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976, Evans, Gareth and McDowell, John, The varities of reference. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982.
36. We chose to formalize through the truth tables to make it clear that the functions are achieved by eliminating the rule of negation, the identity principle and the principle of non-contradiction. You have chosen to ignore more of deviant logics, such as that developed by Lukasiewicz very smart to try to be faithful to the suggestions of Pascal.
37. Löwith, Karl, Writings on Japan, Rubettino, Soveria Mannelli, 1995.
38. Ibid 27.
39. Kurosawa, Akira, The Last Samurai, Baldini & Castoldi, Milano, 1995 pp. 307-308.
40. Akutagawa, Ryunosuke, Rashomon, Hanada Bunka, Taipei, 1995.
41. Kurosawa, Akira, The Last Samurai, op. cit., p. 307.
42. Paul Watzlawick works at the Mental Research Institute in Palo Alto and is principally concerned with problems connecting communication and cognition. See Watzlawick, Paul, The reality of reality, Astrolabe, Rome, 1976.
43. Giorgio Nardone classes held at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Naples on April 14 and May 12, 1994, during the course of Social Psychology (Professor Stanislaus Smiraglia).
44. Blumer, Herbert, Symbolic interactionism: perspective and method, Prentice Halls, Englewood Cliffs, 1968.
45. Tanizaki, Jun'ichiro, In'ei raisan, Chuo Koron Sha, Tokyo, 1975. 
Retrieved ch. 4 of the thesis of Christian Martorella.
Christian Martorella, the concept of the Japanese economy from the epistemological point of view, Faculty of Humanities, University of Genoa, AA 1999-2000.
Chapter 4. The logical form of Japanese thought
4.1 The conceptual difference as an epistemological problem
4.2 Sayonara to the principle of non-contradiction
4.3 The forbidden fruit of the principle of identity
4.4 The rigidity of the principle of non-contradiction
4.5 The Japanese form of truth
4.6 Use of denial in the Japanese language
4.7 The principle of the shadow
Chapter 4. The logical form of Japanese thought
4.1 The conceptual difference as an epistemological problem
At this point in our investigation, we encounter a question that directly concerns the epistemology and that we can not delay further. Ours is a radical approach that is based on the identification of specific patterns of thought. The contribution of philosophy is essential, even if sometimes it does not appear in our analysis, so it is important to be clear about how the problems we are facing. The philosophy of science has developed the notion of conceptual scheme as an instrument of cultural development based on concepts that allow you to judge reality.
The greatest contribution to the study and criticism of the definition of conceptual framework was provided by Donald Davidson, author and so we take the utmost account of (1). According to Davidson, an alternative conceptual scheme would be completely unintelligible. It would be impossible to understand what is conceptually different, says Davidson, if the tools of knowledge are totally different? Although an alternative conceptual scheme existed, it would be impossible to translate in another conceptual scheme. Indeed, many Japanese expressions are untranslatable, and almost meet the criteria required by Davidson unintelligibility.
But it is not our purpose to demonstrate the incomprehensibility of Japanese conceptual scheme, indeed, the contrary, you try to explain it. Nor is our intention to refute Davidson because he objected. In fact, Davidson concludes the chapter on the idea of \u200b\u200bconceptual scheme "contained in Truth and Interpretation, assuming a fairly balanced position:
"[...] In fact we have found no intelligible basis on which to say that two patterns are different. Would be equally wrong to announce the good news that all of humanity - or at least all those who have a language - have in common a conceptual framework and an ontology. In fact, if we can not intelligibly say that two patterns are different, we can not intelligibly say that they are one. [...] From the dogma of dualism between scheme and reality, follows the conceptual relativity, and the truth on that pattern. Without the dogma, this kind of relativity disappears from the field. "[D. Davidson, Truth and Interpretation, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1994, p. 282]
The objections raised by Donald Davidson are interesting, but can be found answered only in a different conceptual scheme. Paradoxically, Davidson tells us that we should abandon the distinction between scheme and content, but in doing so we are not setting a different paradigm? Evidently for Davidson does not exist a conceptual scheme, or at least his definition is not as usual. We'll see how to address this issue difficult but exciting at the end of the entire work. Only possess a clear idea of \u200b\u200bthe system of Japanese thought we could make comparisons. For the moment we try to define the conceptual diversity along the Japanese tell us what the philosophers and scholars in Japan. At the end we will draw the appropriate conclusions. For the moment, however, is useful to define how it is possible to communicate between different conceptual schemes overcome the problems of unintelligibility.
Ludwig Wittgenstein had already shown by implication that there could be communication between different conceptual schemes when he proposed the example of the beetle in a box (See Philosophical Investigations, Par 293). Communication can take place even if the concept of a beetle is different, if our experiences are different, even if our box is empty. "Use a word without justification does not mean to use it without having the right," he says clearly Wittgenstein (ibid., Para 289). The sharing of a few linguistic elements still allows the continuation of the conversation, regardless of the opinions, beliefs, and then dagli schemi concettuali. Wittgenstein, infatti, riconosce la comprensione (condivisione dei giudizi e delle credenze) come un passo ulteriore della comunicazione (Ibidem, Par. 242). La comunicazione non è affatto l'approdo finale del linguaggio, è soltanto il cominciamento.
Riguardo ai problemi di traduzione della lingua giapponese, molti autori giapponesi ne hanno scritto a bizzeffe. Il problema, come sempre, è che la maggior parte di questi testi non sono stati tradotti in lingue occidentali e sono rimasti sconosciuti sia in Europa che in America. Qui citiamo il bel libro, semplice ed essenziale, di Morimoto Tetsuro intitolato Nihongo omote to ura (La lingua giapponese, davanti e dietro) (2). Il titolo è già significativo, meaning that there is a facade, the superficial aspects of language, but also a behind, the deep and hidden aspects that are difficult to perceive. Despite these supposed difficulties, Moritomo provides a very simple and natural that explains the language in alliance with the Japanese sensibility would be part of everyday life.
According to the Japanese, the Japanese language difficulties are due to a perception of reality totally different. But as we said before, this difference depends on the fundamentals (in Japanese Kiso) of thought and its logical laws. If the differences of meaning and beliefs that are found in the Japanese thought that only the emergence of a huge iceberg, differenze che nascono dai fondamenti e dall'elaborazione del pensiero, ossia dalle strutture e leggi logiche, preoccuparsi solo dell'aspetto interpretativo dei significati e delle credenze senza capire da dove scaturiscano è abbastanza limitativo.
Per questo motivo abbiamo scelto di rispolverare la teoria weberiana che non è stata mai usata in ambito epistemologico con la portata e le conclusioni che noi stiamo ottenendo(3). Franco Ferrarotti ha sostenuto che Max Weber sia stato tremendamente sottovalutato(4). Anche noi siamo di questo avviso e intendiamo dimostrarlo utilizzando il metodo weberiano in maniera nuova e pratica.
Il "comprendere" (verstehen) è per Max Weber un processo che utilizza gli schemi concettuali diversi With the principle dell'avalutività. In contrast, the interpretation seems to be a process of accommodation between our conceptual scheme and verbal expression. We have said from the beginning that we renounce our conceptual framework to try to grasp the rationality of Japanese, following the example of the method outlined by Weber. In such a way that groped to "understand" rather than "play."
The only way to get hold of a conceptual scheme is to use it. Groped to limit the problems of translation, using some easy way we would fall into error. In this regard, the Japanese are right in criticizing the West for their superficiality when they approach to culture and society Japanese. The
the western criticism of superficiality and arrogance comes from the finding of an attitude that ignores the existence of a feeling and thinking differently. Or worse, the label as a "lower diversity" that is destined to disappear overwhelmed by western progress.
would be part of philosophy, including Ludwig Wittgenstein had realized that the danger was to confuse the practice with the interpretation (5). When we talk to a partner, we expect to have an appropriate behavior to our expectations, not that it undertakes to interpret his words according to our conceptual scheme. Just as when we order a dish the waiter we expect to be served and wait a speech of appreciation on our refined tastes. This is the difference between practice and interpretation that was shown repeatedly taken up and elaborated by Wittgenstein and Austin's (6).
why we reject the idea of \u200b\u200b"interpret" through our conceptual scheme, not least because it seems inconsistent with the ordinary language philosophy of Wittgenstein, Austin and Grice. If the word is also action, using different words often but not always, means to perform different actions. Many times we have quoted directly in terms of many Japanese with the intent to show the diversity of use of the word. Wittgenstein is teaching us that the meaning is the use of a word. If we used directly una nostra o altre traduzioni, avremmo forse fornito un'idea falsa su quei termini.
Il problema dell'inintelligibilità degli schemi concettuali è ripreso anche da Richard Rorty nel saggio Il mondo finalmente perduto(7). Il suggestivo titolo intende con "mondo perduto" quello del realista ingenuo. In questo saggio, egli analizza la posizione di Davidson e Stroud nei confronti dello "schema concettuale alternativo". Partendo da Hegel e Kant fino a giungere a Heidegger e Dewey, tracciando una particolare storia della filosofia nello stile tipico di Rorty, si descrivono le possibilità che provengono dall'accettazione dell'esistenza di uno schema concettuale alternativo.
Rorty è concorde con Davidson circa l'inintelligibilità the conceptual alternative is to use a series of examples. Among the many bizarre situations proposed by Rorty, one looks very similar to our case, and that is what the inhabitants of the planet Mongo. They have an alternative conceptual framework which would include a different concept of morality, art, science, etc.. If we replaced the example of Rorty "planet Mongo" by "Japanese society", we would be in a situation not dissimilar. The fact that Rorty resorts to imaginary examples drawn from science fiction and does not cite specific cases available and documented, it seems indicative of the need not to be confused with the theoretical examples that require detailed studies.
fact the conclusion of Rorty is not the emergence of a single conceptual framework, assumptions also promptly rejected by Davidson, but the hope of overcoming of idealism and realism.
"But if we come to consider both the theory of coherence is that of comparability of trivia not antagonistic, then we can finally go beyond realism and idealism. We can reach a point where, to quote Wittgenstein, we can to stop doing philosophy when and how we want. " (8)
Here Rorty suggests a solution similar to that of Davidson: The need for a different philosophical paradigm. It seems clear that these authors indicate that there are issues about the conceptual framework would depend on bad definitions of philosophy, what Wittgenstein meant as pseudo-problems. These difficulties should be resolved in a different philosophical system.
For the present work, we decided to follow the Japanese thought from the beginning to the end, and also in respect of these issues we choose to study the Japanese solution. Only by knowing the Japanese philosophical position we can say if it fits into a framework that already exists in the Western tradition, if you have a relationship with the positions of contemporary epistemology and how different and propose again.
But reflection can not miss. The Japanese philosophy (9), with its magnificent development of twelve centuries by Kobo Daishi in Nishida Kitaro, has nothing to envy to the American philosophy, with its lively two centuries by Ralph Waldo Emerson to John Dewey. Perhaps it is ridiculous to continue to support the development of the Japanese philosophy is not affected by the intellectual limits. Also because there are very few Western scholars who have studied contemporary philosophy in Japan. So it is foolish to judge what you do not know.
More interesting is, looking from the Japanese point of view, discover the contortions that afflict Western thought. Continuously listen to various speeches on globalization of the planet. For once we make sure that this globalization and integration also take place with the philosophy. If this world should have no more borders, but they must be slaughtered in our own minds. In this case perhaps right when he sees Hashizume Ludwig Wittgenstein in a rebellion against the Western thought (10). It is not completely reckless recognize the last development of the thought of Wittgenstein's abandonment of truth-functional logic in favor of the language game, the similarities of family and follow a rule (11).
If we were to deliver our vision of the development of Japanese philosophy, it seems to me that the Japanese philosophers are those parties that were the final destinations of Western philosophy: rejection of the principle of non-contradiction (Hegel) and abandonment of truth-functional logic (Wittgenstein).
We realize that to say that the Japanese thought obeys other laws of logic is so disruptive as to constitute a Copernican revolution of today's concept of rationality. Until now it was a common idea that the laws of logic were universal, and even if the philosophy has amply demonstrated the existence of logic "other", it was not considered too much credit with the possibility that human beings use different logics ( 12).
Nobody has bothered to check the logical laws of human thought except ethnologists. But the fact that the work of ethnologists were conducted on primitive peoples, has labeled quel tipo di pensiero come pre-logico, ossia in una fase antecedente e dunque non ancora sviluppato. In questa maniera l'epistemologia ha volutamente ignorato dei risultati scientifici screditandoli (13).
Il caso giapponese è però differente. Nonostante si tenti di spiegare ancora il pensiero giapponese come il residuo di una mentalità tradizionale, ipotesi che ormai non regge più davanti all'evidenza, si sta dimostrando l'infondatezza di tutte le teorie che si limitano a definire la differenza come culturale. Noi affermiamo che esiste una razionalità giapponese con sue precise leggi e intendiamo anche individuarle.
Il problema della razionalità giapponese ha degli epigoni che non possono essere trascurati. Le alternative contemplate are two. Or what we are saying is completely unfounded, and therefore we're telling the biggest canard that has ever been held in a scientific field (using an expression in English: "the pie in the sky"). In that case we should be used on an incredible imagination, and it would therefore take the opportunity to fly immediately changing profession, moving from philosophy to storytelling.
Or we could find a crucial point that calls into question the well established concept of rationality. Understand which of the two alternatives is correct, it is very important from a scientific point of view. If what we are saying is wrong, it means that it is more plausible a logical form of thought one universal. And this is a remarkable scientific achievement. Otherwise, we must note, giving reason to our thesis that there is a plurality of the logical basis of human action.
4.2 Sayonara to the principle of non-contradiction
Since the principle of non-contradiction of one of the basic logic of Western thought, it is natural that it is also one of the claims. The most authoritative critics of the principle of non-contradiction in contemporary Japanese philosophy was expounded by Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945).
Nishida's thought is not an isolated attempt to process the Japanese philosophy, but on the contrary, owes much German idealist philosophy, especially Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, but also to Kant, Hume, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Lotze and Hartmann (we have some documentation in the diaries and correspondence that we bear witness to its interests) (14 ). We know what
Nishida was involved in the study of philosophical texts in Europe, it has become legendary figure of his scholar who spent his nights immersed in reading. There is therefore no reason for surprise if you find Nishida in a revival of Hegel in opposition to the principle of non-contradiction (15).
For Nishida, the contradiction is part of the dialectic of reality. Since the constitutive contradiction of being, it can not be regarded as something apart. The contradiction should not be excluded from reality, so how do you interpret the common sense, as it is placed just inside. So Nishida test a real sense of rejection of the contradiction as presented by the Western tradition. It also showed how Löwith, we had to wait Hegel and Nietzsche to happen because a profound change in philosophy in the West.
The historical fact that for thousands of European philosophy has remained unchanged in principle, can not pass unnoticed. And the thought that these forms of thought have come to join the common Western thought. This sedimentation has become so deep and old to pass unnoticed. Finally, it is believed that certain things were actually a reflection of reality.
While the West was settled this situation, Japan's philosophy turned its attention to itself. Miki Kiyoshi, a student of Nishida, is the author of a unique philosophical text entitled Kosoryoku no ronri (16) (The logic of the conception of thought) which examines the historical development of ideas in the world and their ability to interact with reality.
So the strength of the principle of non-contradiction has more historical reasons and logical-philosophical. Nishida was fully aware of this and decided to use a terminology that distinguished the Western logic by logic Japanese. He coined the term toyoteki ronri, literally "Eastern logic." Here there is no question of translation as the word means ronri logic, and indicates precisely the logic as understood in the West, namely the study of the conditions of correct reasoning.
In Nishida's thought there were several stages of evolution. The latter is formed by the development of a "logic of place" (basho no ronri), an alternative to traditional Western logic and reworking of contemporary philosophical thought. The logic of place (basho no ronri) also means "the identity of contradictions" (mujunteki Doitsu). In fact, according to Nishida one and the many points of view are only two of the same reality (17).
He also speaks of a determination of a linear and circular determination, which are also different aspects of the same reality. Nishida discusses the concept of space and time. The common thought sees time as linear, it goes from past to future. But if the past is what has been, and the future is what is to come, this, given the past and the future, it makes no sense.
This can not be determined from past and future in this way. What we know is only the present moment. Thus, the present, past and future exist simultaneously. Since simultaneity is the characteristic of space, according to Nishida also time and space. Quindi il tempo può essere determinato in due modi, l'uno lineare, rappresentato da una linea verticale, l'altro da uno spazio orizzontale, rappresentato da un cerchio che si chiude. "L'esterno è l'interno, l'interno è l'esterno, l'uno è il molteplice, il molteplice è l'uno" è l'affermazione che Nishida ritiene essenziale. Se per Kant, il tempo è il senso interno e lo spazio il senso esterno, allora, secondo Nishida, l'interno sarà la forma dentro il tempo e l'esterno la forma dentro lo spazio.
La logica del luogo propone un'alternativa alla concezione lineare del tempo considerando il tempo in modo spaziale e circolare. In questa maniera anche le operazione logiche sono stravolte. Il modus ponens, for example, implies a linearity that Nishida's logic does not give so easily. Nishida will not stop an epistemic evaluation, but extend these observations to the historical and social considerations. The opposition individual / company will be given to internal and external relations, therefore an identity.
As you can see, the abandonment of the principle of contradiction provides a rejection of the principle of identity. In Nishida's philosophical system is very clear exposition contradictory identity that is unthinkable without sacrificing the principle of identity. Specifically we will see in the next paragraph, the refusal by the Japanese philosophy of the principle of identity. After
Nishida other major Japanese philosophers have followed this distinction between Western logic (which is taking the principle of non-contradiction) and Eastern logic (which is not accepted the principle of non-contradiction). Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945), a student of Nishida, developed a highly original logic speculative. Based on studies by Pascal (18), and recognize the distinction between spirit and spirit de finesse de géométrie, Miki tried to develop a logical alternative to the logic of reason to explain the power of ideas put to work in the formation of world history. Kosoryoku no ronri (The logic of the conception of thought) (19) is the most significant work that makes This philosophical view of Miki. Even
Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) departed from the logic nishidiana to criticize the Western logic. But the initial formation of Tanabe is also heavily imbued with interests in philosophy of science. In studies devoted to the philosophy of science, as gairon Kagaku (Introduction to the Philosophy of Science) (20), he proves to maneuver skillfully in epistemology. But as has happened to other Japanese philosophers, you will soon realize that Western logic is not compatible with Japanese thinking.
For Tanabe, like Nishida, the contradiction is resolved in an indissoluble unity. But Tanabe stands out immediately from the proposed solutions by Nishida, and produces a logic alternative. The intent of Tanabe is clearly to oppose the solution nishidiana proposing a new development. According to Hajime Tanabe
philosophy must provide mediation between philosophical logic and irrationality of reality. We can not be content to remain spectators of the contradictions of the world. This logic will be the "dialectic of absolute mediation" (no Zettai baikai benshoho). The "logic of species" (shu no ronri) developed by Tanabe replaces the "logic of place" Nishida. According
Tanabe, Nishida mistake when analyzing the individual and the universal regardless of who is mediating between these species (shu). Tanabe believes that it has corrected the logic Nishida, but still considered a follower of the philosopher of Kamakura. Tanabe through the "logic of species" comes to a historical-political definition of the state that would be a mediator between the universal, the individual and the culture. So
Tanabe believes he has given substance to the logic of Nishida that are likely to remain too abstract. But the events of the war deeply impressed that Tanabe will submit its system to be reviewed. He claims to have given too much importance to the nation-state, forgetting the point of departure. Again, no
Shu ronri no benshi (The logic of the dialectic of species) (21) have expressed these thoughts. In his self-criticism, Tanabe will say that his logic was too imbued with the principle of identity, ignoring the relativization of each perspective (what Nishida had done superbly).
Therefore he will land with no tetsugaku Zangedo Toshie (Philosophy as a penance) (22) to a philosophy that shows the limits of reason with respect to existence. In this work, Tanabe shows evil as an absolute good perspective of the individual. Instead, see and recognize the diversity would be an act of freedom that would allow for the peaceful existence of human beings. The story of philosophical
Tanabe is therefore troubled. The game ends in a science studies approach to life. But he leaves us un sistema che ammette una logica alternativa e le implicazioni etiche e storiche che ne derivano.
Anche Takahashi Satomi (1886-1964), autore di un saggio su Edmund Husserl(23) e traduttore di Henri Bergson(24), si è occupato della logica giapponese. Takahashi riconosceva diversi sistemi dialettici e ne tentò una sintesi. I risultati sono raccolti nella sua opera dedicata a questo problema specifico: Ho benshoho (La dialettica avvolgente)(25). La dialettica di Takahashi Satomi ingloba la dialettica hegeliana, la dialettica nishidiana, ma anche la logica formale, in un tentativo audace e inusitato di sintesi. Così come espresso dal suo nome, "dialettica avvolgente" comprende tutte le dialettiche elaborate dalle filosofie occidentali e orientali.
La proposta di Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960) è ancora più originale(26). Egli afferma in Fudo: ningengakuteki kosatu (Il clima: analisi della natura umana) che esiste uno stretto rapporto fra la natura e il carattere umano. L'influenza dei diversi climi porterebbe alla formazione di culture diverse (27). Watsuji riconosce un clima del tifone, un clima del deserto, un clima della prateria che corrispondono alle culture estremo-orientale, medio-orientale e occidentale.
La fine sensibilità e passionalità, il senso di rassegnazione nei confronti destino, la dignità, la tenacia del giapponese sono comprensibili, secondo Watsuji, attraverso l'influenza del clima del tifone. Watsuji, comunque, non tralascia to say that human existence is also strongly influenced by social relations. The thought of Watsuji, then flows into a philosophical system that determines the man as a product of two forces, one natural and one social. In this system, as in that of Miki, the laws of thought are the product of environmental processes, historical and social. So the principles of logic are not regarded as absolute and independent reality. Even Risaku
Mutai (1890-1974) sought to construct a logic for the Eastern thought. Party by the intention to develop a logic to the thought of Nishida (28), Mutai noticed the amplitude of its work and the implications deriving from it. Mutai criticizes the view that the logic Western represents the correct way of thinking (29). According to Mutai, the Western logic is simply a building that is congenial to the Western way of thinking. In this suit opposing a logic of intuition. In another paragraph we shall see in detail what is meant by logical intuition. Nishida also spoke often of intuition, and so is the other Japanese philosophers.
will try to provide an explanation of what in a more formal and less tied to the discourse of Japanese philosophy, so as to avoid the reader a thorough study of the ancient philosophical tradition in Japan.
In this chapter we have shown the positions of some Japanese philosophers on the question the logical form. According to these authors there is no "universal logic." And surely it is not that developed and offered in Europe and America. The Western logic is only one among many possible forms of logic.
4.3 The forbidden fruit of the principle of identity
To use a biblical image, Western philosophy has eaten the forbidden fruit of the principle of identity. But the Eastern philosophy is not occurred in this incident. To be precise, the acceptance of the principle of identity that says that everything is equal to itself, was not accepted so obvious even in the West, until it was, exactly, bite the forbidden fruit. And with that, the man kicked out of Eden was believed to have acquired the knowledge.
Before this incident, the condition of philosophy was different. Heraclitus said that you could not swim in the same river twice, and also many sophisticated positions, such as Gorgias, Protagoras, Zeno, were based on a relativism which does not seem to accept the principle of identity. With Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, a trio certainly enviable, the music changed radically. Socrates insisted on precise definitions and rigorous rebuttals that were using was not adequate to fulfill the principle of identity.
Plato linked the material bodies to ideas, establishing their identity permanently. Aristotle constructed a logic which laid down the principle of identity and other rules that could not help it.
But the beginning of the twentieth century has seen call into question the principle of identity by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The fact that we had to wait a couple of millennia before we criticize the principle of identity is quite staggering. But one can understand the situation if you appreciate the intellectual capacities of the terrible trio composed of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Think freely without the influence of the prodigious trio was quite difficult for Westerners. It still is.
Wittgenstein was placed in a very simple first bite of the forbidden fruit, we should know che cosa stiamo per mangiare. Cos'è realmente il principio di identità? Wittgenstein afferma che è qualcosa di superfluo.
"Che l'identità non sia una relazione fra oggetti è evidente. [...] La definizione, data da Russell di " = " non basta; infatti, secondo essa, non si può dire che due oggetti abbiano in comune tutte le proprietà. [...] Detto approssimativamente: dire di due cose, che esse siano identiche, è un nonsenso; e dire di una cosa che essa sia identica a se stessa, non dice nulla. [...] Il segno d'equivalenza non è dunque parte costitutiva essenziale dell'ideografia." (30)
Con il Tractatus, Wittgenstein ricacciava fuori dalla logica formale il principle of identity. Obviously, the logical Westerners were quick in trying to prove that Wittgeinstein it only joking. Then he received a number of neutralization, but not all with the same range and same implications. The positions are very different and correspond to today's philosophical landscape.
The historical situation that sees a variety of current is indeed due to their inability to provide a unified response to the logical problems raised at the beginning of the twentieth century. Certainly the principle of identity also requires a capacity for abstraction that makes absolute, and then separated from reality, an aspect of the phenomenal world. But it is difficult to argue that there is an immutable reality and that something remains absolutely unchangeable. Therefore, in an attempt to build a logic that was the Tractatus picture of the world, Wittgenstein claims that the principle of identity has no reason for being. Moreover, these philosophical problems have repercussions not religious indifference.
Westerners have always had a bad relationship with the idea of \u200b\u200bdeath. The fact that they do not accept easily its transient nature is indicative of a conception of immutable. The insistence on the expectation of an afterlife was perfect so the impact of that approach.
Eastern religions use the image instead of reincarnation (in Japanese Tensei) to indicate the ever-changing existence. To a Westerner it is still difficult to give up his identity and admit the vanity of his personality.
These observations show the effectiveness of the method of Weber. The beliefs are not only an accessory device, but the manifestation of the mechanisms of different forms of thought. If we can bring back the attitudes and social action in a pattern of thought we caught ("including" Weber would say) that the rationality of the social system.
As indicated by Japanese philosophers, such as choosing a logical principle of identity is not only a formal problem, the historical and social implications are. So in Japan it is theorized con la filosofia contemporanea un diverso sistema logico. Da questa elaborazione dipendeva l'esistenza stessa del sistema culturale e sociale giapponese.
Difendere la specificità del pensiero giapponese è stato il più grande risultato raggiunto dalla filosofia giapponese nel XX secolo.
Quando si può affermare la propria indipendenza intellettuale, tutti gli attacchi alla propria identità culturale sono vani.
4.4 La rigidità del principio di non-contraddizione
Blaise Pascal è un pensatore a torto trascurato, essendogli riservato spesso uno spazio limitato nei manuali di filosofia. In Giappone, invece, è stato al centro di importanti studi da parte di Miki Kiyoshi che lo riteneva un autore fondamentale (31).
This preliminary observation is needed to understand the existence of a tradition of Western philosophy that studies are completely ignored in Europe and America. There is a history of philosophy is still unknown that waits only to be brought to light.
Perhaps we have assumed that it is not. You can not say that the history of philosophy is complete until it is supplemented by the work of Japanese scholars.
As we said earlier, is a philosopher Pascal neglected, and often forgets what he was rooted in the spirit of mathematical and logical. So many of his statements are read only from the religious point of view. In this
so has escaped most of the performers a claim that Pascal is not just about morals, but it was a genuine critique of the principle of non-contradiction.
"Contradiction is a bad brand of truth. Many things certain are contradicted. Many false pass without contradiction. Neither the contradiction is the mark of falsehood or contradiction is not the mark of truth." (32)
Another thought is still false:
"Imagination. It is the dominant part of man, that mistress of error and falsehood, and all the more treacherous than ever it is, since it is infallible rule of Indeed, if it were infallible lie. "(33)
The second of these thoughts is the solution of outright liar paradox that has haunted generations of logic to arrive at more sophisticated forms proposed by Bertrand Russell (34).
Pascal argues strongly that the contradiction is not possible to determine the truth. One can not say that a proposition is false because contradictory, and vice versa is not true because contradictory. It also appears that Pascal does not accept the use of the logical negation of how it is taught by tradition .
So the negation of a truth is not always a lie and vice versa. If it seems strange that the denial of a proposition does not provide the truth value of reverse is the case to reflect a bit 'with some examples.
There is a funny way to present a case of ambiguity by saying that "a glass is half empty" or "a glass is half full." Apparently the two statements express opposing concepts, but in fact describe the same physical phenomenon. Using this example we build two propositions: "The glass is not half empty, half full" and "The glass is half full, half empty."
This is an ambiguity that does not allow a unique opinion. One could say that both are true? But it should be noted that the second is the negation of the first perfect. In case this is not always the negation di un proposizione fornisce un valore di verità inverso. E non si può dire che esistano sempre situazioni in cui determinare il valore di verità sia ovvio.
La vita concreta offre più spesso situazioni intermedie e quasi mai degli estremi. Affrontare la realtà vedendo le cose in due soli modi, bianco o nero, è alquanto pericoloso e irrealistico. La logica usa un criterio binario della verità, ma gli esseri umani sono costretti a usare strutture logiche ben meno rigide.
Il secondo esempio è il più eloquente ed è quello del paradosso del mentitore: "Io sono un mentitore". Questa affermazione è vera o falsa? Se usiamo una struttura rigida della verità cadiamo nel paradosso. Ma se ascoltiamo il suggerimento Pascal, considering that lying is not always false otherwise infallible rule of truth, the paradox disappears.
And so is the reality: we are in front of the confession of a liar or a joke of an honest. As we shall also John McDowell (35), the solution lies in context and not in the sentence. There is no paradox if you choose well the evaluation criteria.
Today we can formalize these observations of Pascal, which was not possible in his time. If we then consider these recommendations without delay, not accepting the negation operator as an inverse function, we gain four truth tables corresponding to the different possible worlds (36).
p ~ p
------
VFV
FVF
p ~ p
------ VVV
FFF
p ~ p
------ VVV
FVF
p ~ p
------
VFV
FFF
Using these tables to the negation operator along with the connective junction is obtained:
p ^ ~ p -----
-
VFFV
FFVF
p ^ ~ p
------- VVVV
FFFF
p ^ ~ P
------- VVVV
FFVF
p ^ ~ p -------
VFFV
FFFF
The first table corresponds to the classical principle of non-contradiction, the other three consequences of Pascal's logic. As Pascal says, the contradiction would not be "brand of falsehood" (marque de fausse) and non-contradiction "brand truth" (marque de vérité). Following the tables derived from the observation of Pascal shows that the truth of the conjunction connective can be contradicted, and falsehood is always challenged. Faced with the contradiction do not know if we are in presence of a truth or a lie, even though the odds are that it is a lie higher. Pascal would suggest that a probabilistic view of truth is not an unreasonable assumption when one considers the subject of the bet and all its related studies. In conclusion, the truth can not be inferred by the contradiction that can only speak of falsehood.
An example can show the validity of Pascal's logic. We will also try to be faithful to the explanation of the French philosopher that we first reported. Let's see what happens with the deduction: "The fish has fins and lives in the water," "The dolphin has fins and lives in the water," "The dolphin is a fish."
In these propositions the first and second are true, but the third is true according to the logic, while the second is false reality. If we assume the traditional logic commit a wrong inference that we try to avoid the contradiction (the dolphin's fins and lives in water, but is not a fish), considering that the contradiction is the enemy of truth. Only non-rigid
use of negation and the principle of non-contradiction, as indicated by Blaise Pascal, we can not know a fallacy. In fact, the logic Pascal admits the contradiction where none is permitted by the traditional logic. In this case, Pascal's logic is closer to reality. The
conventional wisdom had instead provided a formulation of the contradiction was too oriented to exclusion. It was so unique that both the principle of non-contradiction was considered insufficient and approached from the principle of excluded middle.
course, as the logicians know, you tried to solve these problems with a more careful use of quantifiers. But all that has come to complicate the situation with the flaps fully described in history textbooks of logic. Quantifiers can be used correctly if we have a perfect knowledge of the sets on which we are operating. But against the reality we do not have a complete knowledge of the elements that compose it. Seeking to safeguard logica dandole uno statuto assoluto che la ponesse in un mondo separato da quello reale non è stata una soluzione soddisfacente. Che scopo avrebbe una scienza che non abbia alcun rapporto con la realtà? La matematica e la geometria hanno avuto nascita e sviluppo da esigenze molto concrete. Difficilmente si può accettare di chiamare scienza ciò che si distacca dalla realtà. Si è mai visto qualcosa che è conoscenza di ciò che non è nella realtà?
Ma cosa ha a che fare tutto ciò con il modo di ragionare dei giapponesi? Qui abbiamo voluto formalizzare ciò che adesso vedremo descritto in termini più discorsivi. Questa premessa era necessaria perché il livello di complessità a cui ci stiamo accostando is growing and we need more and more refined logical tools to grab the Japanese rationality.
We said in the introduction that also address the issue of diversity Japanese would have involved the questioning of the concept of rationality. And so far we have respected what you said.
4.5 The Japanese form of truth
In carrying out our exploration adventure, we often have the chance to meet other travelers that we are precious gifts. This time it's up to Karl Löwith. In 1936 the German philosopher Karl Löwith, to escape racial persecution, lived in Japan, where he taught until 1941 at the University of Sendai, anno in cui il Giappone entrò in guerra.
Questa esperienza di Löwith non fu marginale, ma influenzò non poco la sua concezione della storia della filosofia, soprattutto nella sua critica all'impostazione teologica ebraico-cristiana. Ciò gli fu possibile grazie all'esperienza in Giappone che gli aveva permesso di vedere la filosofia occidentale in modo distaccato e diverso.
Löwith fu un attento osservatore del mondo giapponese e scrisse interessanti saggi sulla mentalità dei giapponesi, attualmente riordinati e pubblicati in maniera più unitaria (37).
Löwith afferma che la verità giapponese non coincide con la verità occidentale. Ma soprattutto è l'uso che si fa del concetto di verità che è totally different. "In Japan, however, the kindness - or rather a conventional lie - it is the policy of what we call truth," he says Löwith (38).
He adds that the Japanese are "incapable of responding adequately to requests for they are too direct and aggressive." So the truth is something that is negotiated: "That the truth we must openly express a personal opinion reflecting, in the eyes of the Japanese is a sign of rudeness and selfishness, because it does not take into account the feelings of the other minimum. A truth traded in a sociable atmosphere facilitates reciprocity in tacit agreement on the rules of the game. " But above all
Löwith clearly indicates there is truth to the Japanese: "For them the whole truth is a pragmatic thing, which can be modified to reflect the actual situation."
Löwith gives us a definition of truth is essential that the Japanese really meaningful for our model of understanding of Japanese thought. The truth is based on a Western adaequatio rei et intellectus, a comparison and comparison with reality, but the truth is in relation to the Japanese community of individuals in whom it is shared. The report is completely different.
Truth western
Adequacy
The truth is the reality one
The truth is outside the subject
The assessment criterion is related to the facts
Truth Japanese
Using instrumental
Truths are many
The truth is internal to the subject
The assessment criterion is related to the community
Japanese
The truth can not use the criterion of adaequatio rei et intellectus because, as we saw earlier, there is no concept of reality as the West. The reality of the Japanese is its soul and its feel, nothing else.
Since there is no objective reality, there can be no objective truth. So the truth is something che è contrattato. Il risultato è una concezione relativistica della verità.
Questa concezione del relativismo della verità ha avuto un'esposizione artistica nel celeberrimo film Rashomon di Kurosawa Akira (39). Kurosawa mise in scena alcuni episodi tratti dall'omonimo libro di Akutagawa Ryunosuke (40). Uno di questi episodi è quello del racconto intitolato Yabu no naka (Nella boscaglia).
In un bosco è stato trovato il cadavere di un samurai, e per il delitto sono processati il bandito Tajomaru e la moglie del samurai. Essi sono interrogati. Il bandito dice di aver aggredito la coppia e di aver legato il samurai. Dopo aver avuto un amplesso con la donna, fu ella a suggerirgli di uccidere l'uomo e di scappare insieme. La moglie del samurai afferma invece che dopo essere stata violata, il marito la guardava con disprezzo. Ella lo uccise per punirlo. Ma attraverso una sciamana viene interrogato anche lo spirito del samurai. Il samurai dice di essersi ucciso per disperazione e per riscattare l'onore perso dopo aver visto la donna mettersi d'accordo con il bandito. Chi mente? Dov'è la verità nei tre racconti? La morale di questa vicenda è che "ricordiamo solo quello che ci fa comodo, e ci abbellisce agli occhi degli altri" (41).
Questo film di Kurosawa ebbe un enorme successo, tanto da essere premiato con il Leone d'oro nel settembre 1951. Per noi ha un immenso valore perché è la rappresentazione artistica del concetto di verità giapponese descritto da Löwith. Forse questa è la prima volta che si usa un film come documentazione di un trattato filosofico, ma noi siamo figli dei nostri tempi e sappiamo quanto sia forte l'influenza della cinematografia nella nostra epoca.
4.6 Uso della negazione nella lingua giapponese
Non sempre una negazione porta a un valore di verità contrario. Sarebbe forse sorprendente se si ritrovasse questo aspetto nella lingua giapponese? In effetti le cose stanno proprio così. La negazione nella lingua giapponese non è così forte come nelle lingue occidentali. Questo appare evidente, per esempio, nell'uso delle espressioni "mi piace" e "non mi piace".
Nel giapponese esistono due verbi: suki (essere piacevole) e kirai (essere sgradevole). But the denial of suki does not fully correspond to Kira.
Say "ringo ga suki dewanai" (I do not like apples) does not mean that apples are undesirable, but simply that they are not among the favorite fruit (like that). So it is very likely that the other person eat the apples. While saying "ringo ga kira by" (apples I unwelcome), is to reject and then do not eat apples.
These differences begin to grow up in a real conversation, when you express your thoughts. The Japanese are surprised to learn that in Italian, "not like" (suki dewanai) corresponds to "unwelcome" (Kira by).
formalize this aspect of Japanese thought using suki and Kira.
Expression Findings
suki from (+ + +)
suki dewanai (+ / -)
dewanai kira (- / +)
by kira (- - -)
With "by suki" means a preference for that thing with "suki dewanai" that there is a preference, with "kira dewanai" which is not unwelcome, then with "Kira from" there is unwelcome. These four expressions are each very different according to the Japanese.
As in the formalization of the logic of Pascal, even here we get a scheme with four outputs. The fact that repetition of this "fourfold path" is not casual, but has an internal reason. Not accepting the denial as the operator che fornisce il valore inverso di quello dato, si finisce per sdoppiare i valori di verità di una proposizione che nella logica tradizionale potevano essere solo due.
Quello che può sorprendere è invece la corrispondenza fra logica pascaliana e lingua giapponese. Löwith diceva che la verità giapponese è pragmatica, quindi non dobbiamo stupirci se la forma logica che essa assume è quella quadruplice e non quella binaria della logica tradizionale e classica (che ha avuto il massimo sviluppo con la logica booleana).
Che la negazione non sia usata come nelle lingue occidentali ci è indicato anche da altri studiosi. Come segnalato dallo psicologo Paul Watzlawick(42), il pensiero occidentale ha una tendenza al ragionamento per negazioni (es.: se non è così, allora...), cosa che non avviene con frequenza nel pensiero giapponese(43).
4.7 Il principio dell'ombra
Finora abbiamo esposto quello che il pensiero giapponese non è, esponendo le diversità dal pensiero occidentale. Adesso possiamo dire anche quel che è. Eliminati il principio di identità e il principio di non-contraddizione, dobbiamo necessariamente trovare altri principi che siano alla base della logica giapponese. La ricerca non è difficile, considerando che i filosofi giapponesi hanno dedicato tutti i loro sforzi per individuare questi principi.
Come abbiamo visto in precedenza, Nishida, Tanabe e Mutai hanno fatto riferimento a una certa "logica dell'intuizione". We prefer to use a sociological approach to the theory of communication to clarify as what science may appear dark using the language of these authors.
So we will use an alternative definition to that provided by Japanese philosophers. This is not because there is a difference, but for simple reasons of exposition and simplification. That is why we refer to the concept of "tacit knowledge".
The concept of "tacit knowledge" has been developed in anthropology and sociology to denote the set of knowledge and beliefs shared by a community that is used implicitly, without prior exposure of the rules. Sociological theories that refer all'interazionismo symbolic allowed to develop an alternative model to the regulatory environment (eg. Durkheim).
In these models, there is no system of rules, values, status, roles that would guide the action of the individual, but it is born dall'autointerazione (44). All the latest sociological models have questioned the existence of a system of explicit rules which guide the actions of the individual. That said it is easier to understand the concept of tacit knowledge.
It is always said that the Eastern character to hide things by being so mysterious and inscrutable. In this respect there is an important work that describes in detail this feature in Japan. It
Tanizaki's book entitled Jun'ichiro In'ei raisan (Praise the shadow) (45). According to the sensitivity and expressiveness Tanizaki Japanese born in the shadow, or in hiding.
This principle can be reported in the shadow of the discourse on the logical form of Japanese thought. Only the shadow principle can explain the reasoning mechanisms without the principle of identity and non-contradiction that we have previously explained. Indeed
principle of shadow on the one hand, and principles of identity and non-contradiction, on the other, are two divergent paths. The principles of logical form Japanese are irreconcilable with the Western principles. Is there really an alternative logic of Eastern thought.
Japanese philosophers have continually repeated and insisted on the existence of an intuitive knowledge. Unfortunately it is not a philosophical language that would make understandable this evanescent concept of tacit knowledge. Today they are at our disposal tools and theories of communication that allow us to capture and make accessible the concepts that were elusive to the Japanese philosophers.
In this chapter we have shown that there is a logical alternative to Western logic. This rule rejects the negation of the principle of identity and the principle of non-contradiction. These principles were replacing an intuitive principle, the principle of the shadow, which allows the formulation of opinions through interaction with reality.
The concept of truth developed by Japanese Löwith provided a clearer explanation of the principle of shadow and how they are actually made in reviews of Japanese thought. Everything seems to indicate not only that there is a Japanese form of rationality, but these funds so that the entire cognitive system to have its own laws of logic.
Notes 1. Regarding the position of Davidson read: Davidson, D., Inquieres into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984. (Trad. it. Davidson, D., Truth and Interpretation, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1994). For the notion of "conceptual scheme": Davidson, D., On the very idea of \u200b\u200ba conceptual scheme, in "Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association," No 47, 1974, pp. 5-20 (trad. it. Davidson, D., The turning contemporary relativistic epistemology, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1988, pp. 151-167). In Japan you can see the volume edited by Hiroyuki Hattori and Masayoshi Shibata: Davidson, D., Koi to dekigoto, Keiso Shobo, Tokyo, 1990. There is also a comment to this work of Davidson Kashiwabata, Tatsuya, to Koi no dekigoto sonzairon, Keiso Shobo, Tokyo, 1997.
2. Moritomo, Tetsuro, Nihongo omote to ura, Shinchosha, Tokyo, 1985.
3. Recall that Habermas has provided an extraordinary development of the theory of Weber, but not the epistemology his work was well received: Habermas, Jürgen, Theory of Communicative Action, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1985.
4. See Franco Ferrarotti in the preface to the second edition of Weber, Max, Sociology of religion, UTET, Torino, 1988, pp. 7-11.
5. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Einaudi, Torino, 1967, pp. 9-10 and pp. 102-117.
6. Austin, John L., How to do things with words, Marietti, Genova, 1987, pp. 7-32.
7. Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Pragmatism, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1986, pp. 39-51 (translated Japanese. Yuro by Hisashi: Rorty, Richard, no Tetsugaku datsuochiku: puragumatizumu no kiketsu, Ochanomizu Shobo, Tokyo, 1985).
8. Rorty, Richard, Consequences del pragmatismo, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1986, p. 51.
9. Le opere in lingue occidentali dedicate alla storia della filosofia giapponese sono davvero poche. Consigliamo per la filosofia giapponese contemporanea: Piovesana, G. K., Recent japanese philosophical thought 1862-1962. A survey, Enderle Bookstore, Tokyo, 1963 (trad. it. Piovesana, G. K., Filosofia giapponese contemporanea, Patron, Bologna, 1968), Oe, S., "Japan", in Les grands courants de la pensée mondiale contemporaine, Marzorati, Milano, 2 voll., 1959, pp. 935-963. Per quanto riguarda la filosofia giapponese antica è invece sufficiente consultare i testi dedicati allo zen, per esempio: Hisamatsu, Shin'ichi, La pienezza del nulla, Il Melangolo, Genova, 1993. Obviously, the Japanese text are numerous, here we recall Yura, Tetsuji, Tetsugakushisojiten, Fuji Shoten, Tokyo, 1948.
10. Hashizume, Daisaburo, no Bukkyo gensetsu senryaku, in "Gendaishiso", Special Issue, vols. 13-14, pp. 272-291, Seidosha, Tokyo, 1985.
11. There are many texts that have the affinity between the thought of Wittgenstein and Zen, see: "Wittgenstein and Zen" in Canfield, John V., The philosophy of Wittgenstein, "elective affinities", Vol 15, Garland Publishing, 186 , pp. 383-408 and Wiehnpahl, Paul, Zen and work of Wittgenstein, in "Chicago Review, Vol 12, No 2, 1958, pp. 67-72.
12. For deviant logics, see Marsonet, Michele, Introduction to multi-purpose logic, Abete, Roma, 1976.
13. Only Feyerabend insisted on the plurality of different types of rationality. In this regard it should read Marsonet, Michael, Science and linguistic analysis, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1994, p. 45.
14. Nishida, Kitaro, Nishida Kitaro zenshu bekkan 1, Nikki, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1951, p. 4.
15. The value of the Hegelian dialectic from a logical point of view read Marsonet, Michele, logic and language, Pantograph, Genova, 1993, p. 59.
16. Miki, Kiyoshi, no Kosoryoku ronri, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
17. See Nishida, Kitaro, Nishida Kitaro zenshu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1949, vol. 7, p. 204 and vol. 1, p. 86.
18. Miki, Kiyoshi, Pascal's okeru ningen no kenkyu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1980.
19. Miki, Kiyoshi, no Kosoryoku ronri, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
20. Tanabe, Hajime, gairon Kagaku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1918.
21. Si consulti Tanabe, Hajime, Tanabe Hajime zenshu, Chikuma Shobo, Tokyo, 1976.
22. Tanabe, Hajime, no toshite Zangedo tesugaku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1946.
23. Takahashi, Satomi, no genshogaku Husserl, Nipponsha, Tokyo, 1931.
24. Bergson, Henri, Busshitsu to kioku, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1936.
25. Takahashi, Satomi, Ho benshoho, Risosha, Tokyo, 1947.
26. Watsuji, Tetsuro, Tetsuro Watsuji zenshu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1992.
27. Watsuji, Tetsuro, Fudo: ningengakuteki kosatu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1979.
28. Mutai, Risaku, no Basho ronrigaku, Kobundo, Tokyo, 1944.
29. Mutai, Risaku, Shisaku to kansatsu, Keiso Shobo, Tokyo, 1971.
30. These paragraphs 5.5301, 5.5302, 5.5303 and 5533 of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. See Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Einaudi, Torino, 1989, pp. 120-123.
31. Miki, Kiyoshi, Pascal ni okeru ningen no Kenkyu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1980.
32. Pascal, Blaise, Debris, Rizzoli, Milan, 1983, p. 242. Correspond to the thoughts in the catalog Brunschvicg No Catalogue No 384 and Lafuma 177.
33. Ibid 121. Catalogue No Brunschvicg Catalogue No. 82 and Lafuma 44.
34. The problem of the antinomy Russell was of paramount importance for science. It put the project into crisis Frege who tried to found mathematics through logic. And consequently undermined the attempt to Hilbert for a program to formalize mathematical theories. Russell tried to propose a solution to the antinomy with the theory of types. In fact, the Russellian antinomy arises, as he explains, from a problem of set theory. Russell estimated the work of Cantor on set theory, and sought a solution to it, as evidenced by the theory of types. Our solution is based instead on the non-acceptance of pincipi identity and contradiction. Crf. Russell, Bertrand, The Principles of Mathematics, Longanesi, Milan, 1951, pp. 713-721.
35. In recent years, John McDowell has insisted on the principle of contextuality reworking Kant's proposals in its own way. In this regard, see the following report: Bezante, Alexander and Martorella, Christian, on McDowell's essay "De Re Senses", Philosophy of Language (Professor Carlo Penco), Faculty of Humanities, University of Genoa, AA 1998-1999. The proposals are very interesting and original McDowell also discussing the ideas of Evans and Burge. Please read McDowell, John, Mind and World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1996 (trad. it. McDowell, John, Mind and world, Einaudi, Turin, 1999) Evans, Gareth and McDowell, John, Truth and Meaning, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976, Evans, Gareth and McDowell, John, The varities of reference. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982.
36. We chose to formalize through the truth tables to make it clear that the functions are achieved by eliminating the rule of negation, the identity principle and the principle of non-contradiction. You have chosen to ignore more of deviant logics, such as that developed by Lukasiewicz very smart to try to be faithful to the suggestions of Pascal.
37. Löwith, Karl, Writings on Japan, Rubettino, Soveria Mannelli, 1995.
38. Ibid 27.
39. Kurosawa, Akira, The Last Samurai, Baldini & Castoldi, Milano, 1995 pp. 307-308.
40. Akutagawa, Ryunosuke, Rashomon, Hanada Bunka, Taipei, 1995.
41. Kurosawa, Akira, The Last Samurai, op. cit., p. 307.
42. Paul Watzlawick works at the Mental Research Institute in Palo Alto and is principally concerned with problems connecting communication and cognition. See Watzlawick, Paul, The reality of reality, Astrolabe, Rome, 1976.
43. Giorgio Nardone classes held at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Naples on April 14 and May 12, 1994, during the course of Social Psychology (Professor Stanislaus Smiraglia).
44. Blumer, Herbert, Symbolic interactionism: perspective and method, Prentice Halls, Englewood Cliffs, 1968.
45. Tanizaki, Jun'ichiro, In'ei raisan, Chuo Koron Sha, Tokyo, 1975.
Sunday, August 1, 2010
Is It Best To Tan Before Or After Workout
Wittgenstein e il buddhismo
Article on the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Buddhism published in the journal "Quaderni Asians." See
Christian Martorella, affinity between Zen Buddhism and the philosophy of Wittgenstein, in "Quaderni Asians", n. 61, March 2003, pp.91-99.
affinity between Zen Buddhism and Wittgenstein's philosophy of Christian Martorella
Wittgenstein and Eastern thought
Who is in charge of Eastern philosophy, particularly Zen Buddhism, can not but be surprised to find in a Western thinker, so alien the context of Asian culture, a significant amount of affinity. This is especially interesting if you add that Wittgenstein knew nothing works and authors Eastern. He had studied at the Technical University of Berlin and the Faculty of Engineering of Manchester, was finally dedicated to the study of logic at Cambridge. As you can see his interests were far from any text of Eastern philosophy. Yet Wittgenstein found himself facing the same problems that had committed the sages of India, China and Japan. Why? Simply because the research field was the same: language. Buddha had pointed to the eastern origin of suffering. A bad or excessive use thought of benefit to man tension, anxiety, fear and suffering. Wittgenstein was a man deeply troubled by the same problems. He was strongly dissatisfied with the inability of Western philosophy in responding to his questions. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he stated: "(...) the value of this work is then, secondly, to show how little worth having solved these problems "(1).
Philosophy of Language
Wittgenstein realized that the problems of philosophy are false problems, so its investigation moves on the analysis of these pseudo-problems. The aim of Wittgenstein's philosophy is only to show and delete pseudo-problems.
Wittgenstein was not the first to identify a logical fallacy in the ambiguity of language and the origin of the speculative problems of errors and therefore the whole philosophy. In India, with a skill just as equal, Nagarjuna was able to show the emptiness of every concept and every word. The similarities between the teachings of Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein go further. According to Nagarjuna, as Buddhism teaches, everything is in relationship with others, and nothing makes sense without the other. Wittgeinstein speaks of the principle of contextuality, and says a very similar concept. The meaning of a word or a concept depends on its context. Nagarjuna argued the language prammaticità Wittgeinstein and reiterates the instrumentality of the word by saying that the meaning and use.
Philosophy as therapy
According to Wittgenstein the purpose of philosophy is not to erect a building of concepts, philosophical system, but rather a continuous and thorough control over the language. Philosophy should provide a "grammar" perspicuous language (2). It is not a doctrine but an activity.
The noblest form of Buddhism, free of superstition and metaphysical beliefs, have the same attitude. Buddhism, especially Zen, requires constant practice, not a religion that requires only the measure of faith (3). Pray and believe is totally inadequate. Piuttosto è la pratica con un impegno che implica la totale partecipazione dell’individuo a caratterizzare tale filosofia. Attraverso la meditazione zazen oppure con quesiti koan, il Buddhismo persegue questa strategia che intende liberare l'individuo dagli errori che controllano la sua mente.
Koan di Wittgenstein
Inconsapevole di tale tradizione, anche Wittgeinstein però ne applicò il metodo. Le sue lezioni erano molto simili a sedute in cui i discepoli vengono interrogati attraverso l’uso di un koan. Che Wittgenstein praticasse tale tecnica ci è testimoniato dalle sue stesse opere che restano enigmatiche se non si interpreta correttamente il modo d'operare dell'autore. Ma vediamo da vicino questi esempi di koan Wittgenstein.
"Could a machine think?" (Philosophical Investigations, Par.359)
"The chair thinks to himself: where? In one of its parts? Or outside the body?" (Philosophical Investigations, Par.360)
"I'm going to leave tomorrow. When you have the intention? Continuously or intermittently?" (Zettel, Par.46)
"Consider the command: Laugh sincerely to this joke!" (Zettel, Par.51)
"What it means: the truth of a proposition is certain?" (On Certainty, Par.193)
"So, if you doubt it, or I'm not sure that this is my hand, why do not I have to question the meaning of these words?" (On Certainty, Par.456)
None of these questions can have a precise answer. Contrary to what happens to the questions in the usual Western philosophical tradition. As the koan, the answer is outside of the concepts framed by the question. Wittgenstein shows us the embarrassment or the paradox of its questions arise from the lack of clarity of language and deception come from this. To understand his questions we must destroy the machinery of prejudice that control our minds.
The prospect of Japanese philosophers
affirm the existence of an affinity between Zen and Wittgenstein's philosophy is merely a hypothesis with no possibility of verifying if not kept it account the current philosophical studies in Japan. In fact, a thorough knowledge of contemporary Japanese philosophy, Wittgenstein tells us that it is among Western authors looked at with interest. Some Japanese scholars come to say that there would be a very strong consonance between his philosophical method and practice of Zen. The net position in this regard is taken by the sociologist Hashizume Daisaburo (4). In no wise Bukkyo gensetsu senryaku (verbal strategy of Buddhism), he comes to say, according to his interpretation, Wittgenstein would have even suffered the ostracism of Western culture permeated by the spirit of Judeo-Christian. According to Hashizume, philosophy of language Wittgenstein would first and foremost a critique of truth-functional logic, and secondly, an alternative to Western conceptual system based on a dialectic discourse and determination, but abstract. It is not entirely unfounded regarded as Wittgenstein has quickly achieved through the introduction of truth tables, the maximum development of truth-functional logic. And note, especially, how much is left unsatisfied at the point of completely changing the approach to the problems of philosophy and linguistics.
Hashizume goes on to analyze the strategies of Buddhism in order to achieve satori. He compares the language game (Sprachspiel) Wittgenstein's techniques of Buddhism to reach the state of enlightenment. Satori has the same problems of the philosophical system based on the language game. For example, the paradox of pain perception (5). Wittgenstein had seen in phrases like "I feel pain" and "he feels pain," a phenomenological diversity due to a relapse. Pain is a unique experience and its verbal expression ("I feel pain") is different by the words we do not know the pain of others ("He feels pain"). It thus remains an indiscernible that the grammar is not fully revealed. At least the grammar of Western languages, we know that in Japan things are very different, distinguishing the two sentences from the point of grammar.
Hashizume finds an analogy in the state of satori. We do not know what satori. To know what we get. But when we met, how do we know who is really the satori? This problem arises from a linguistic trap. Basing only on a knowledge of language, we lose most of the faculties that allow us to act on reality.
To resolve this difficulty, recognizing the inescapable reality of the language, immersed in the reality, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of 'rule-following "(6). Hashizume recognizes the "rule-following" a practice similar to the technique of Buddhism. Orientalists have in mind the notion of C, follow a path, and how it is made. The teacher indicates, does not explain what to do. He shows a procedure, the student repeats it. The conceptual element, the explanation and the theory is entirely absent.
Important in this regard, it is also wise ni okeru Chinmoku Wittgenstein (in Wittgenstein's silence) of the philosopher Hajime Nakamura (7). Nakamura trace the outlines of a philosophy-oriented but not discursive practices. This corresponds to the teachings of Zen, but also to what Wittgenstein has made his philosophical work. The Japanese use the term mushin to describe a void of emotions and thoughts that would be the basis for meditation and subsequent enlightenment. Nakamura identifies Wittgenstein with an empty silence, stopping the use of truth-functional logic and dialectic discourse. Returning to
Hashizume, we see that the Japanese sociologist arrives to explain certain aspects of Buddhism through the philosophy of Wittgenstein. According to Hashizume, you can find the principle of 'rule-following "in the condition of the Buddhist community (sangha) that includes monks (bhikku), the novices (samanera) and laity (upasakas). In this case, no one knows the "rule". It should identify with the figure of the Buddha. But who really knows Buddha? So everyone is trying to follow his model, precisely "follow the rule." To do this, need only recall the words of Wittgenstein that the outstanding issues: "There are not enough rules, but we also need examples. Our rules leave open some loopholes, and the practice has to speak for itself" (8). For Buddhism, the supreme example is the Buddha.
Wittgenstein showed that the danger was to confuse the "follow a rule" with "interpreting a rule." A threat that struck at the roots every kind of philosophy of language that conflicted with an abstract and conceptual use of the word. The kind of philosophy that Wittgenstein disliked by his notion of "meaning as use." A conception of language, as noted by Hashizume, who was shot by John Austin (9), and allowed to return to practice the language. Conclusions
You could say that Wittgenstein brought to light a different conception of philosophy, much closer to the Eastern tradition. According to this view, the thought would not have a mental picture of the world, to speculate something, otherwise it would also be quite truthful to reality. Instead, the Eastern philosophy shows us the opposite. Rather the thought is something that is produced by our mind in relation to the world. Human error is to confuse thought with the world. The failure of Western philosophy is the attempt to explain the world with his thoughts. The thought may explain only the thought, and life is something else.
Notes 1. See Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Einaudi, Torino, 1989 ("New Universal Einaudi" / 196), p. 5.
2. "Method of philosophy: the perspicuous representation of the facts of grammar." See Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophy, Donzelli, Rome, 1996, p. 27.
3. "It is only such action as the existence of Buddhist life becomes completely free (...)". See Hisamatsu, Shin'ichi, a religion without God, The melangolo, Genova, 1996, p. 69.
4. Hashizume, Daisaburo, no Bukkyo gensetsu senryaku, in "Gendaishiso," special issue Voll. 13-14, Seidosha, Tokyo 1985.
5. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Einaudi, Torino, 1995, pp.119-138.
6. Ibid, pp.108-116.
7. Nakamura, Hajime, Wittgenstein ni okeru Chinmoku, in "Gendaishiso," special issue Voll. 13-14, Seidosha, Tokyo, 1985, pp. 210-217.
8. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, Einaudi, Torino, 1978, p. 26.
9. Austin, John, How to do things with words, Marietti, Genova, 1987.
Bibliography AA.VV., Wittgenstein, in "Gendaishiso," special issue Voll. 13-14, Seidosha, Tokyo, 1985.
Andronicus, Marilena, Marconi, Diego, Penco, Carlo, Understanding Wittgenstein, Marietti, Genova, 1988.
Canfield, John, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Vol.15, "elective affinities, Wittgenstein and Zen", Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986, pp.383-408.
Gargani, Aldo, Introduction to Wittgenstein, Laterza, Bari, 1973.
Martorella, Christian, language games and satori, Report for the School of Philosophy of Language, University of Genoa, AA 1998-1999.
McGuinness, Brian, Wittgenstein: A Life, Duckworth, London, 1988.
Kenny, Anthony, Wittgenstein, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1973.
Perissinotto, Luigi, Wittgenstein. A guide, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1997.
Wienpahl, Paul, Zen and Work of Wittgenstein, in "Chicago Review, Vol.12, No.2, 1958, pp.67-72.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, Einaudi, Torino, 1989.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Ricerche filosofiche, Einaudi, Torino, 1967.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Della certezza, Einaudi, Torino, 1978.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Zettel, Einaudi, Torino, 1986.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Della certezza, Einaudi, Torino, 1978.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Libro blu e Libro marrone, Einaudi, Torino, 1983.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Osservazioni filosofiche, Einaudi, Torino, 1976.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Osservazioni sui colori, Einaudi, Torino, 1982.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Osservazioni sopra i fondamenti della matematica, Einaudi, Torino, 1971.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Pensieri diversi, Adelphi, Milan, 1980. 
Article on the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Buddhism published in the journal "Quaderni Asians." See
Christian Martorella, affinity between Zen Buddhism and the philosophy of Wittgenstein, in "Quaderni Asians", n. 61, March 2003, pp.91-99.
affinity between Zen Buddhism and Wittgenstein's philosophy of Christian Martorella
Wittgenstein and Eastern thought
Who is in charge of Eastern philosophy, particularly Zen Buddhism, can not but be surprised to find in a Western thinker, so alien the context of Asian culture, a significant amount of affinity. This is especially interesting if you add that Wittgenstein knew nothing works and authors Eastern. He had studied at the Technical University of Berlin and the Faculty of Engineering of Manchester, was finally dedicated to the study of logic at Cambridge. As you can see his interests were far from any text of Eastern philosophy. Yet Wittgenstein found himself facing the same problems that had committed the sages of India, China and Japan. Why? Simply because the research field was the same: language. Buddha had pointed to the eastern origin of suffering. A bad or excessive use thought of benefit to man tension, anxiety, fear and suffering. Wittgenstein was a man deeply troubled by the same problems. He was strongly dissatisfied with the inability of Western philosophy in responding to his questions. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he stated: "(...) the value of this work is then, secondly, to show how little worth having solved these problems "(1).
Philosophy of Language
Wittgenstein realized that the problems of philosophy are false problems, so its investigation moves on the analysis of these pseudo-problems. The aim of Wittgenstein's philosophy is only to show and delete pseudo-problems.
Wittgenstein was not the first to identify a logical fallacy in the ambiguity of language and the origin of the speculative problems of errors and therefore the whole philosophy. In India, with a skill just as equal, Nagarjuna was able to show the emptiness of every concept and every word. The similarities between the teachings of Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein go further. According to Nagarjuna, as Buddhism teaches, everything is in relationship with others, and nothing makes sense without the other. Wittgeinstein speaks of the principle of contextuality, and says a very similar concept. The meaning of a word or a concept depends on its context. Nagarjuna argued the language prammaticità Wittgeinstein and reiterates the instrumentality of the word by saying that the meaning and use.
Philosophy as therapy
According to Wittgenstein the purpose of philosophy is not to erect a building of concepts, philosophical system, but rather a continuous and thorough control over the language. Philosophy should provide a "grammar" perspicuous language (2). It is not a doctrine but an activity.
The noblest form of Buddhism, free of superstition and metaphysical beliefs, have the same attitude. Buddhism, especially Zen, requires constant practice, not a religion that requires only the measure of faith (3). Pray and believe is totally inadequate. Piuttosto è la pratica con un impegno che implica la totale partecipazione dell’individuo a caratterizzare tale filosofia. Attraverso la meditazione zazen oppure con quesiti koan, il Buddhismo persegue questa strategia che intende liberare l'individuo dagli errori che controllano la sua mente.
Koan di Wittgenstein
Inconsapevole di tale tradizione, anche Wittgeinstein però ne applicò il metodo. Le sue lezioni erano molto simili a sedute in cui i discepoli vengono interrogati attraverso l’uso di un koan. Che Wittgenstein praticasse tale tecnica ci è testimoniato dalle sue stesse opere che restano enigmatiche se non si interpreta correttamente il modo d'operare dell'autore. Ma vediamo da vicino questi esempi di koan Wittgenstein.
"Could a machine think?" (Philosophical Investigations, Par.359)
"The chair thinks to himself: where? In one of its parts? Or outside the body?" (Philosophical Investigations, Par.360)
"I'm going to leave tomorrow. When you have the intention? Continuously or intermittently?" (Zettel, Par.46)
"Consider the command: Laugh sincerely to this joke!" (Zettel, Par.51)
"What it means: the truth of a proposition is certain?" (On Certainty, Par.193)
"So, if you doubt it, or I'm not sure that this is my hand, why do not I have to question the meaning of these words?" (On Certainty, Par.456)
None of these questions can have a precise answer. Contrary to what happens to the questions in the usual Western philosophical tradition. As the koan, the answer is outside of the concepts framed by the question. Wittgenstein shows us the embarrassment or the paradox of its questions arise from the lack of clarity of language and deception come from this. To understand his questions we must destroy the machinery of prejudice that control our minds.
The prospect of Japanese philosophers
affirm the existence of an affinity between Zen and Wittgenstein's philosophy is merely a hypothesis with no possibility of verifying if not kept it account the current philosophical studies in Japan. In fact, a thorough knowledge of contemporary Japanese philosophy, Wittgenstein tells us that it is among Western authors looked at with interest. Some Japanese scholars come to say that there would be a very strong consonance between his philosophical method and practice of Zen. The net position in this regard is taken by the sociologist Hashizume Daisaburo (4). In no wise Bukkyo gensetsu senryaku (verbal strategy of Buddhism), he comes to say, according to his interpretation, Wittgenstein would have even suffered the ostracism of Western culture permeated by the spirit of Judeo-Christian. According to Hashizume, philosophy of language Wittgenstein would first and foremost a critique of truth-functional logic, and secondly, an alternative to Western conceptual system based on a dialectic discourse and determination, but abstract. It is not entirely unfounded regarded as Wittgenstein has quickly achieved through the introduction of truth tables, the maximum development of truth-functional logic. And note, especially, how much is left unsatisfied at the point of completely changing the approach to the problems of philosophy and linguistics.
Hashizume goes on to analyze the strategies of Buddhism in order to achieve satori. He compares the language game (Sprachspiel) Wittgenstein's techniques of Buddhism to reach the state of enlightenment. Satori has the same problems of the philosophical system based on the language game. For example, the paradox of pain perception (5). Wittgenstein had seen in phrases like "I feel pain" and "he feels pain," a phenomenological diversity due to a relapse. Pain is a unique experience and its verbal expression ("I feel pain") is different by the words we do not know the pain of others ("He feels pain"). It thus remains an indiscernible that the grammar is not fully revealed. At least the grammar of Western languages, we know that in Japan things are very different, distinguishing the two sentences from the point of grammar.
Hashizume finds an analogy in the state of satori. We do not know what satori. To know what we get. But when we met, how do we know who is really the satori? This problem arises from a linguistic trap. Basing only on a knowledge of language, we lose most of the faculties that allow us to act on reality.
To resolve this difficulty, recognizing the inescapable reality of the language, immersed in the reality, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of 'rule-following "(6). Hashizume recognizes the "rule-following" a practice similar to the technique of Buddhism. Orientalists have in mind the notion of C, follow a path, and how it is made. The teacher indicates, does not explain what to do. He shows a procedure, the student repeats it. The conceptual element, the explanation and the theory is entirely absent.
Important in this regard, it is also wise ni okeru Chinmoku Wittgenstein (in Wittgenstein's silence) of the philosopher Hajime Nakamura (7). Nakamura trace the outlines of a philosophy-oriented but not discursive practices. This corresponds to the teachings of Zen, but also to what Wittgenstein has made his philosophical work. The Japanese use the term mushin to describe a void of emotions and thoughts that would be the basis for meditation and subsequent enlightenment. Nakamura identifies Wittgenstein with an empty silence, stopping the use of truth-functional logic and dialectic discourse. Returning to
Hashizume, we see that the Japanese sociologist arrives to explain certain aspects of Buddhism through the philosophy of Wittgenstein. According to Hashizume, you can find the principle of 'rule-following "in the condition of the Buddhist community (sangha) that includes monks (bhikku), the novices (samanera) and laity (upasakas). In this case, no one knows the "rule". It should identify with the figure of the Buddha. But who really knows Buddha? So everyone is trying to follow his model, precisely "follow the rule." To do this, need only recall the words of Wittgenstein that the outstanding issues: "There are not enough rules, but we also need examples. Our rules leave open some loopholes, and the practice has to speak for itself" (8). For Buddhism, the supreme example is the Buddha.
Wittgenstein showed that the danger was to confuse the "follow a rule" with "interpreting a rule." A threat that struck at the roots every kind of philosophy of language that conflicted with an abstract and conceptual use of the word. The kind of philosophy that Wittgenstein disliked by his notion of "meaning as use." A conception of language, as noted by Hashizume, who was shot by John Austin (9), and allowed to return to practice the language. Conclusions
You could say that Wittgenstein brought to light a different conception of philosophy, much closer to the Eastern tradition. According to this view, the thought would not have a mental picture of the world, to speculate something, otherwise it would also be quite truthful to reality. Instead, the Eastern philosophy shows us the opposite. Rather the thought is something that is produced by our mind in relation to the world. Human error is to confuse thought with the world. The failure of Western philosophy is the attempt to explain the world with his thoughts. The thought may explain only the thought, and life is something else.
Notes 1. See Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Einaudi, Torino, 1989 ("New Universal Einaudi" / 196), p. 5.
2. "Method of philosophy: the perspicuous representation of the facts of grammar." See Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophy, Donzelli, Rome, 1996, p. 27.
3. "It is only such action as the existence of Buddhist life becomes completely free (...)". See Hisamatsu, Shin'ichi, a religion without God, The melangolo, Genova, 1996, p. 69.
4. Hashizume, Daisaburo, no Bukkyo gensetsu senryaku, in "Gendaishiso," special issue Voll. 13-14, Seidosha, Tokyo 1985.
5. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Einaudi, Torino, 1995, pp.119-138.
6. Ibid, pp.108-116.
7. Nakamura, Hajime, Wittgenstein ni okeru Chinmoku, in "Gendaishiso," special issue Voll. 13-14, Seidosha, Tokyo, 1985, pp. 210-217.
8. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, Einaudi, Torino, 1978, p. 26.
9. Austin, John, How to do things with words, Marietti, Genova, 1987.
Bibliography AA.VV., Wittgenstein, in "Gendaishiso," special issue Voll. 13-14, Seidosha, Tokyo, 1985.
Andronicus, Marilena, Marconi, Diego, Penco, Carlo, Understanding Wittgenstein, Marietti, Genova, 1988.
Canfield, John, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Vol.15, "elective affinities, Wittgenstein and Zen", Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986, pp.383-408.
Gargani, Aldo, Introduction to Wittgenstein, Laterza, Bari, 1973.
Martorella, Christian, language games and satori, Report for the School of Philosophy of Language, University of Genoa, AA 1998-1999.
McGuinness, Brian, Wittgenstein: A Life, Duckworth, London, 1988.
Kenny, Anthony, Wittgenstein, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1973.
Perissinotto, Luigi, Wittgenstein. A guide, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1997.
Wienpahl, Paul, Zen and Work of Wittgenstein, in "Chicago Review, Vol.12, No.2, 1958, pp.67-72.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, Einaudi, Torino, 1989.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Ricerche filosofiche, Einaudi, Torino, 1967.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Della certezza, Einaudi, Torino, 1978.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Zettel, Einaudi, Torino, 1986.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Della certezza, Einaudi, Torino, 1978.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Libro blu e Libro marrone, Einaudi, Torino, 1983.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Osservazioni filosofiche, Einaudi, Torino, 1976.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Osservazioni sui colori, Einaudi, Torino, 1982.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Osservazioni sopra i fondamenti della matematica, Einaudi, Torino, 1971.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Pensieri diversi, Adelphi, Milan, 1980.
Vc-211a Capturedriver
La violenza del buddhismo dalla storia alla dottrina
Article published by the violence of Buddhism in Japan discuss blog.
The violence of Buddhism from the history of Christian doctrine
Martorella
July 1, 2010. The rumor that describes Buddhism as a peaceful religion and devoted to meditation is so cruel as false. Unfortunately, the history of Buddhism tells us about the exact opposite, and Japan are the most striking examples of the transgression of the principle of non-violence of those so revered Buddhist masters.
who does not believe the texts of historians, hastily judged as questionable, and then ignored, it can easily be forced to surrender using the semantics of language. In fact, the Japanese language dictionaries contain a word that issues a final ruling, a clear and irrevocable. This word is Sohei. Sohei The word is composed of two kanji (Chinese characters) which means Buddhist monaco (so) and soldier (hei). The Sohei warrior monks were armed fighting for the interests of their monastery or religious sect. Contrary to what one might expect, the Sohei were not only defensive function, but participated actively in wars. The political influence of the monks was so strong that the leader Oda Nobunaga decided to exterminate them not to impede his rise to power. On 29 September 1571, the Enryakuji temple, the main monastery of the Tendai sect, was destroyed. The monks and civilians were killed mercilessly. In 1573 the shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki allied with the warrior monks who fought against its rival. The warrior monks were always an important part in the military history of Japan, until the tax was not belligerent to the entire country unified and pacified by the Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1867).
What most concerns the phenomenon of militant Buddhism warrior, is the ease with which the Buddhist masters fueled bigotry and incitement to violence. A particular example is provided by the relationship between the samurai and the Shijo Kingo monaco Nichiren. Knowing the fierce and warlike character of Shijo Kingo, took advantage of Nichiren psychology in the service of his cause: the creation of a Buddhist sect that was supposed to have hegemony in Japan, and besides the whole world. Rather than cause them to drop their weapons and change their lifestyle, Nichiren always encouraged him in his battles have gone so far as to say that it was preferable "to live a single day with honor than to die a hundred and twenty years in disgrace." A clear invitation to die for his cause.
Shijo Kingo survived, but many other followers of Nichiren died fighting for him, and the testimonials are provided by the widows of desperate letters sent to Monaco with the request for aid. The idea that Shijo Kingo had a violent temper is not a malicious criticism of his detractors, but un fatto storico riconosciuto anche dai suoi ammiratori (1).
Gli episodi di violenze e aggressioni fra le sette buddhiste rivali furono tanto diffusi che le autorità decisero di prendere seri provvedimenti. Nel 1279 vi fu una repressione dei seguaci di Nichiren, un evento noto come Atsuhara honan (crisi di Atsuhara). In quella occasione furono arrestate ben 20 persone, e 3 furono condannate a morte e giustiziate.
Dunque sono innegabili le violenze compiute in nome del buddhismo. La questione non è più chiedersi quante furono le vittime, aspetto storicamente inconfutabile, ma perché ciò avvenne. La risposta è semplice. La dottrina di Nichiren rifiutava gli insegnamenti provvisori (shakumon) di Buddha, ritenuti meno importanti worthy of respect and basic education (honmon). Unfortunately between the provisional teachings (shakumon) there is also the principle of non-violence. Nichiren, on the contrary, justified his faith in the religion only daimoku. The daimoku is a mantra, recited a formula repeatedly made by the title of the Lotus Sutra and preceded by the word namu means to praise, honor (from Sanskrit NAMAS). Daimoku, in fact, literally means the title, and indicate the title of the Lotus Sutra, Myoho renge kyo in Japanese. The invention of reciting the daimoku is not an original work of Nichiren, but had been formulated by Kukai (2) of the Shingon sect.
Nichiren had studied in his youth, when it was known with the name of Zeshobo Renco (3), at the Shingon school, and knew very well so esoteric practices. Although in his writings are still critical to the esoteric Buddhism, and especially invective that ridiculed the magic of the Shingon sect and Kegon (4), Nichiren restraint and did not scruple to use it anyway. Went so far as to support the tantric sex say that reciting the daimoku during sexual intercourse would be immediately reached enlightenment (5). The doctrine of Nichiren gradually detached itself from all forms of Buddhist teaching, eliminating any question of a doctrinal character, and relying solely on faith and the benefits derived from religious practice. The daimoku thus became a slavish nenbutsu imitation of the mantra recited by opponents of the Jodo sect.
In fact, these forms of Japanese Buddhism, which fought very viciously among themselves, were in fact similar. Nichiren, Honen and Shinran preached the same principles: the use of mantra exasperated, leaving creed, sectarian exclusivism. The Jodo sect, for example, has always maintained that the worst of sinners would have had access to the Pure Land simply reciting the nenbutsu. This has often been interpreted as independence of the conduct of the person from grace (tariki) of Amida Buddha. According to Shinran, the sinner can be saved only by faith that is a gift of Amida. The more a man is spiritually unprepared, it has the opportunity to be saved because it is incapable of the slightest personal effort, opposed even less resistance to saving power of Amida. This is the meaning of the paradox of Shinran who said: "Even the good go to heaven, especially the bad ones!"
The fundamental problem of Japanese Buddhism in these forms and meanings, is to have a high tendency towards amorality. A characteristic feature of the Japanese native religion, Shinto, a religion is to be aesthetic, almost alien to morality and selfless. Often the goods are identified with the pleasure and beauty. This happens even when Japanese Buddhism focuses on obtaining practical benefits materials. In fact, Japanese Buddhism mingled and fused irreversibly with Shinto beliefs, so as to remain unaffected. This is called syncretism shinbutsu Konko or shinbutsu shugo, but is also indicated by the name of ryobu Shinto.
thinkers such as Nichiren, Honen and Shinran did not notice even to be determined by the cultural trends of their times, even said on the contrary, to detach themselves and be original. None of this would be a danger, even if interesting and unique aspects would not be spoiled by a creed that abandonment is to eliminate all critical voice. The idea of \u200b\u200beliminating the duality of good and evil (zen aku ropes) and to challenge the doctrinal rigidity, is a lively and fruitful development of the Japanese philosophy of Buddhism and in fact inherited from Shintoism. But ignore the devastating impact that religious fanaticism can have, as we have seen so far, represents the greatest danger to society, whether Western or Eastern Europe.
Those who believe in Buddhism must also firmly reject blind obedience to a faith that instead of enlightenment and wisdom produces dullness and closing. When asked to "replace the faith in the wisdom" is implicitly to give up claims to enlightenment and the Buddha, what a true Buddhist will never accept.
Notes 1. Daisaku Ikeda speaks of a "tendency to anger." See Daisaku Ikeda, The Wisdom of the Lotus Sutra, Arnoldo Mondadori, Milan, 2005, p.188.
2. See the Lotus Sutra, translated by Luciana Meazza, introduction by Francesco Sferra, Rizzoli, Milano, 2006, p.22.
3. Nichiren, whose real name at birth was Zennichimaro was initiated for religious life at a young age and was ordained in 1237 under the name of Monaco to Kiyosumidera Zeshobo Renco. He then went all'Enryakuji to deepen the study of Tendai thought, and then in Koya, where he studied Shingon theories.
4. The Shingon sect, founded by Kukai Monaco, is inspired by the Vajrayana Buddhism and Tantric address, making extensive use of mantras and mandalas, and in particular of magic rituals. Kegon the sect, known as school floral ornament, is a school that is based on the teaching of Mahayana sutra Avatamsaka. The central theme of the sect Kegon is the unity and interdependence of all things and all events.
5. The Gosho is located in this statement is called earthly desires are enlightenment. See Nichiren Daishonin, The Writings of Nichiren Daishonin, vol.4, Italian Institute of Buddhist Soka Gakkai, Florence, 2000, p.145.
Bibliography
Arena, Leonardo Vittorio, Samurai. The rise and fall of a great warrior caste, Arnoldo Mondadori, Milan, 2002.
Arena, Leonardo Vittorio, The spirit of Japan. The philosophy of the Rising Sun from its origins to the present day, Rizzoli, Milan, 2008.
Filoramo, John (ed.), Dictionary of Religions, Einaudi, Torino, 1993.
Forzani, Joseph, The flowers of the vacuum. Introduction to Japanese philosophy, Boringhieri Bollati, Torino, 2006.
Henshall, Kenneth, History of Japan, Arnoldo Mondadori, Milan, 2005.
Komatsu, Hosho, Nichiren Shonin zenshu, Shunjusha, Tokyo, 1998.
Moore, George Foot, History of Religions, Laterza, Bari, 1963.
Sansom, George Bailey, Japan. A Short Cultural History, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1978.
Sansom, George Bailey, A History of Japan, 3 vols., Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958-1963.
Yampolsky, Philip, Selected Writings of Nichiren, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990. 
Article published by the violence of Buddhism in Japan discuss blog.
The violence of Buddhism from the history of Christian doctrine
Martorella
July 1, 2010. The rumor that describes Buddhism as a peaceful religion and devoted to meditation is so cruel as false. Unfortunately, the history of Buddhism tells us about the exact opposite, and Japan are the most striking examples of the transgression of the principle of non-violence of those so revered Buddhist masters.
who does not believe the texts of historians, hastily judged as questionable, and then ignored, it can easily be forced to surrender using the semantics of language. In fact, the Japanese language dictionaries contain a word that issues a final ruling, a clear and irrevocable. This word is Sohei. Sohei The word is composed of two kanji (Chinese characters) which means Buddhist monaco (so) and soldier (hei). The Sohei warrior monks were armed fighting for the interests of their monastery or religious sect. Contrary to what one might expect, the Sohei were not only defensive function, but participated actively in wars. The political influence of the monks was so strong that the leader Oda Nobunaga decided to exterminate them not to impede his rise to power. On 29 September 1571, the Enryakuji temple, the main monastery of the Tendai sect, was destroyed. The monks and civilians were killed mercilessly. In 1573 the shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki allied with the warrior monks who fought against its rival. The warrior monks were always an important part in the military history of Japan, until the tax was not belligerent to the entire country unified and pacified by the Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1867).
What most concerns the phenomenon of militant Buddhism warrior, is the ease with which the Buddhist masters fueled bigotry and incitement to violence. A particular example is provided by the relationship between the samurai and the Shijo Kingo monaco Nichiren. Knowing the fierce and warlike character of Shijo Kingo, took advantage of Nichiren psychology in the service of his cause: the creation of a Buddhist sect that was supposed to have hegemony in Japan, and besides the whole world. Rather than cause them to drop their weapons and change their lifestyle, Nichiren always encouraged him in his battles have gone so far as to say that it was preferable "to live a single day with honor than to die a hundred and twenty years in disgrace." A clear invitation to die for his cause.
Shijo Kingo survived, but many other followers of Nichiren died fighting for him, and the testimonials are provided by the widows of desperate letters sent to Monaco with the request for aid. The idea that Shijo Kingo had a violent temper is not a malicious criticism of his detractors, but un fatto storico riconosciuto anche dai suoi ammiratori (1).
Gli episodi di violenze e aggressioni fra le sette buddhiste rivali furono tanto diffusi che le autorità decisero di prendere seri provvedimenti. Nel 1279 vi fu una repressione dei seguaci di Nichiren, un evento noto come Atsuhara honan (crisi di Atsuhara). In quella occasione furono arrestate ben 20 persone, e 3 furono condannate a morte e giustiziate.
Dunque sono innegabili le violenze compiute in nome del buddhismo. La questione non è più chiedersi quante furono le vittime, aspetto storicamente inconfutabile, ma perché ciò avvenne. La risposta è semplice. La dottrina di Nichiren rifiutava gli insegnamenti provvisori (shakumon) di Buddha, ritenuti meno importanti worthy of respect and basic education (honmon). Unfortunately between the provisional teachings (shakumon) there is also the principle of non-violence. Nichiren, on the contrary, justified his faith in the religion only daimoku. The daimoku is a mantra, recited a formula repeatedly made by the title of the Lotus Sutra and preceded by the word namu means to praise, honor (from Sanskrit NAMAS). Daimoku, in fact, literally means the title, and indicate the title of the Lotus Sutra, Myoho renge kyo in Japanese. The invention of reciting the daimoku is not an original work of Nichiren, but had been formulated by Kukai (2) of the Shingon sect.
Nichiren had studied in his youth, when it was known with the name of Zeshobo Renco (3), at the Shingon school, and knew very well so esoteric practices. Although in his writings are still critical to the esoteric Buddhism, and especially invective that ridiculed the magic of the Shingon sect and Kegon (4), Nichiren restraint and did not scruple to use it anyway. Went so far as to support the tantric sex say that reciting the daimoku during sexual intercourse would be immediately reached enlightenment (5). The doctrine of Nichiren gradually detached itself from all forms of Buddhist teaching, eliminating any question of a doctrinal character, and relying solely on faith and the benefits derived from religious practice. The daimoku thus became a slavish nenbutsu imitation of the mantra recited by opponents of the Jodo sect.
In fact, these forms of Japanese Buddhism, which fought very viciously among themselves, were in fact similar. Nichiren, Honen and Shinran preached the same principles: the use of mantra exasperated, leaving creed, sectarian exclusivism. The Jodo sect, for example, has always maintained that the worst of sinners would have had access to the Pure Land simply reciting the nenbutsu. This has often been interpreted as independence of the conduct of the person from grace (tariki) of Amida Buddha. According to Shinran, the sinner can be saved only by faith that is a gift of Amida. The more a man is spiritually unprepared, it has the opportunity to be saved because it is incapable of the slightest personal effort, opposed even less resistance to saving power of Amida. This is the meaning of the paradox of Shinran who said: "Even the good go to heaven, especially the bad ones!"
The fundamental problem of Japanese Buddhism in these forms and meanings, is to have a high tendency towards amorality. A characteristic feature of the Japanese native religion, Shinto, a religion is to be aesthetic, almost alien to morality and selfless. Often the goods are identified with the pleasure and beauty. This happens even when Japanese Buddhism focuses on obtaining practical benefits materials. In fact, Japanese Buddhism mingled and fused irreversibly with Shinto beliefs, so as to remain unaffected. This is called syncretism shinbutsu Konko or shinbutsu shugo, but is also indicated by the name of ryobu Shinto.
thinkers such as Nichiren, Honen and Shinran did not notice even to be determined by the cultural trends of their times, even said on the contrary, to detach themselves and be original. None of this would be a danger, even if interesting and unique aspects would not be spoiled by a creed that abandonment is to eliminate all critical voice. The idea of \u200b\u200beliminating the duality of good and evil (zen aku ropes) and to challenge the doctrinal rigidity, is a lively and fruitful development of the Japanese philosophy of Buddhism and in fact inherited from Shintoism. But ignore the devastating impact that religious fanaticism can have, as we have seen so far, represents the greatest danger to society, whether Western or Eastern Europe.
Those who believe in Buddhism must also firmly reject blind obedience to a faith that instead of enlightenment and wisdom produces dullness and closing. When asked to "replace the faith in the wisdom" is implicitly to give up claims to enlightenment and the Buddha, what a true Buddhist will never accept.
Notes 1. Daisaku Ikeda speaks of a "tendency to anger." See Daisaku Ikeda, The Wisdom of the Lotus Sutra, Arnoldo Mondadori, Milan, 2005, p.188.
2. See the Lotus Sutra, translated by Luciana Meazza, introduction by Francesco Sferra, Rizzoli, Milano, 2006, p.22.
3. Nichiren, whose real name at birth was Zennichimaro was initiated for religious life at a young age and was ordained in 1237 under the name of Monaco to Kiyosumidera Zeshobo Renco. He then went all'Enryakuji to deepen the study of Tendai thought, and then in Koya, where he studied Shingon theories.
4. The Shingon sect, founded by Kukai Monaco, is inspired by the Vajrayana Buddhism and Tantric address, making extensive use of mantras and mandalas, and in particular of magic rituals. Kegon the sect, known as school floral ornament, is a school that is based on the teaching of Mahayana sutra Avatamsaka. The central theme of the sect Kegon is the unity and interdependence of all things and all events.
5. The Gosho is located in this statement is called earthly desires are enlightenment. See Nichiren Daishonin, The Writings of Nichiren Daishonin, vol.4, Italian Institute of Buddhist Soka Gakkai, Florence, 2000, p.145.
Bibliography
Arena, Leonardo Vittorio, Samurai. The rise and fall of a great warrior caste, Arnoldo Mondadori, Milan, 2002.
Arena, Leonardo Vittorio, The spirit of Japan. The philosophy of the Rising Sun from its origins to the present day, Rizzoli, Milan, 2008.
Filoramo, John (ed.), Dictionary of Religions, Einaudi, Torino, 1993.
Forzani, Joseph, The flowers of the vacuum. Introduction to Japanese philosophy, Boringhieri Bollati, Torino, 2006.
Henshall, Kenneth, History of Japan, Arnoldo Mondadori, Milan, 2005.
Komatsu, Hosho, Nichiren Shonin zenshu, Shunjusha, Tokyo, 1998.
Moore, George Foot, History of Religions, Laterza, Bari, 1963.
Sansom, George Bailey, Japan. A Short Cultural History, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1978.
Sansom, George Bailey, A History of Japan, 3 vols., Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958-1963.
Yampolsky, Philip, Selected Writings of Nichiren, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990.
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